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INTRO DUCT ror; 
Shortly after the Norman conquest, the king's 
justice became organized and regular, and superseded 
nearly all the functions of1 the ancient county and 
hundred courts. This rapid extension of the king's 
peace continued until it was the normal and general 
1 
safeguard of public order. The king centralized his 
power until it had expanded so greatly that Sir John 
Banks', Charles I's Attorney-General, could say with some 
truth: "Whatsoever was not granted from the crown re-
2 
maineth in the person of the king." 
James .I claimed that "the state of monarchy is 
the supermost thing upon earth. Fqr kings are not only 
God's lieutenant upon earth and sit upon God's throne, 
but even by God Himself are called gods." Like God, 
••• they make and unmake their subjects. They 
have the power of raising and casting down, of 
life and of. death, judges over all, and yet 
accountable to none but God only. They have 
the power to exalt low things and abase high 
things and make subjects like men at the chess, 
a pawn to take a bishop or knight, for to 
emperors or kings their subjects' bodies and J 
goods are due for their defense and maintenance. 
1. Frederick Pollock, "An€=lo-Saxon Law," 
·English Historical Review 8 (189JJ:252. 
2. Chester and Ethyn Kirby, "The Stuart Game 
Prerogative," English Historical Review 46 (1931) 1 
239. 
J. JD. Harris Willson, King James VI and I 
(New York, 1956), p. 24J. Hereinafter cited as: 
Willson, James Vi and I. 
2 
In Sir Edward Coke's earlier days, he too had 
been a supporter of the sanctity of the crown. In 
1603, when Coke was Attorney-General, he prosecuted 
Sir Walter Raleigh for treason, In the trial Coke 
tried to ride roughshod over the defendant. With 
vigor he attacked Raleigh with remarks that were "shame-
4 
ful and unworthy " of a man in his position. He was 
also careless at the quality of the evidence upon 
5 
which he based his assertions. With such judicial 
intimidation, the Attorney-General was able to secure 
6 
a verdict of guilty for the crown. 
From his position as staunch supporter of the 
crown, Coke gradually underwent a metamorphosis. Final-
ly Edward Coke became the man who stood in direct op-
. position to the royal prerogative as defined by James. 
Coke moved to the position that law--common law, or 
natural law, had an existence of its own, independ-
ent of all the will of man, even perhaps the will of 
7 
God. 
4. Catherine Drinker Bowen, The Lion and 
Throne: the Life and Times of Sir Edward Cokes 
1 4 (Boston, 195 , p. 195. Hereinafter cited ass 
Bowen, Lion and the Throne. 
5. Samuel R. Gardiner, History of England from 
the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil 
War: 1603-1642, vol. 1, (London, 1900), p. 127. Herein-
after cited as: Gardiner, History of England. 
6. A study of the trial is in: Bowen, Lion and 
the Throne, p. 190-217, and Gardiner, History of England, 
vol. 1, p. 120-138 •. 
7. R. W. K. Hinton, "English Constitutional 
J 
James I was to fight for his prerogative, and 
Coke, from his position on the bench, was to oppose it. 
Coke explained the extent of the royal prerogative in 
the following manner: 
It is a maxime, that the common law hath 
so admeasured the prerogative of the king, 
that they should not take away, nor pre-judice the inheritance of any; and the 
best inheritance that a subject hath, is 
the law of the Realm •••• There is nothing 
more conducing to the good Weal of a state, 
than to live under the oeconomy of just 
and wholsome laws.8 
If these opposing views had remained without 
conflict, the great constitutional developments of the 
seventeenth century would.not have occured then. But 
this was not to be, and the battleground became the 
bench upon which Coke sat, determined to uphold the 
off ice and duty of a judge which he believed was to: 
Cherish the quiet and Peace of the Church, 
Clergy and people; that they would keep 
and observe the ancient laws and customes 
of the Kingdome which were received and 
established by consent of the whole people, 
and abrogate all such customes and laws 
which will ill and naught. And Lastly, 
that they would to the utmost of their 
powers, assure the Peace of the People 
and theire kingdome, and procure it from 
Theories from Sir John Fortescue to Sir John Eliot," 
English Histori6al Review 75 (1960): 421. Hereinafter 
cited as: Hinton, "Constitutional Theories." 
8. Com Cooke, Magna Charta Made in the Ninth 
Year of King Henry the Th.ird and Confirmed by K. Edward 
the first in the twentv-ei.e:ht year of his Reign with · 
Some Short but Necessar Observations from the C ief 
Justice Coke's Comments Upon It (London, 1680 , 
preface. 
9 
others. 
And in upholding his judicial office, the root of 
Coke's thought became his firm belief that the law 
10 
was purely an insular product from which he made the 
common law the supreme law in the realm. The sole 
exponents of this supreme law were the judges who 
11 
became unfettered and unco~trolled, save by the law. 
It was because of his profound knowledge of the common 
law of England and his commitment to its supremacy 
that Coke stands unrivaled. As a judge he was not 
only above suspicion of corruption but at great risk 
he displayed an independence and dignity of deportment 
which would have deserved the highest credit even if 
he had held tenure and could have defied the dis-
12 
pleasure of the government. Even one of his 
staunchest rivals, Lord Campbell, could only extol Sir 
Edward as a judge: 
Although holding his office at the pleasure 
9. John Cowell, The Institutes of the Lawes 
of En land Di ested into the Method of Civil and 
Imperiall Institutions Londnn, 1 51 , p. 2 9. 
10. J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution 
and the Feudal Law (New York, 1967), p.-63. Herein-
after cited as: Pocock, Ancient Constitution. 
11. William Holdsworth, "Sir Edward Coke, 11 
Some Makers of En lish .Law: the Ta ore Lectures: 1 
1938 Cambridge, 1938 , p. 115. Hereinafter cited as: 
Holdsworth, Some Makers of English Law. 
12. John Gist, "The Writings of Sir Edward 
Coke," Yale Law Journal 18 (1909): 515. Hereinafter 
cited as: Gist, "Writings of Sir Edward Coke." 
5 
of a King and Ministers disposed to 
render the Courts of Justice the instru-
ments of their own tyranny and caprice, 
he conducted himself as much lofty 
independence as3any who have ornamen-ted the Bench. 1 
Coke's independent nature helped make the 
first half of the seventeenth century the turning-
14 
point in English constitutional and legal history. 
This paper will deal with some of those constitutional 
conflicts involving Sir Edward Coke that helped to 
transform English law. 
1J. Charles Warburton James, Chief Justice 
Coke: H"s Famil and Descendants at Ho~l~k~h-a~m--~(~L-o-n~d--on, 
1929 , p. Jl. Hereinafter cited asi James, Cokes 
His Family. · 
14. Holdsworth, Some Makers of English Law, 
p. 111. 
EDWARD COKE ON THE BENCH 
Sir Edward Coke's first attack on the est-
ablished system of laws was against Archbishop 
Bancroft's disciplinary body, the Ecclesiastical High 
Commission, which had been authorized in 1559, by an 
act of parliament, to keep order within the Est-
ablished Church, discipline the clergy and punish such 
lay offenses:as were included in the ecclesiastical _ 
jurisdiction. Since James's accession to the throne, 
the Commission had grown larger and called itself a 
1 
court--the Court of High Commission. 
The conflict between the ecclesiastical courts 
and the courts of common law was not new, but came to 
a head during the reign of James I. The temporal 
-courts had been accustomed to enforcing their monopoly 
of temporal jurisdiction by issuing "writs o:f pro-
2 
hibition" forbidding the spiritual court from pro-
ceeding further in particular cases which might come 
1. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, p. 295. 
2. Blackstone defines a prohibition as a 
"Writ issuing properly only out of the court of King's 
Bench, being the King's prerogative writ; but, for the 
furtherance of justice, it may also be had in some 
cases out of the court of chancery, common pleas, or 
exchequer; directed to the judge and parties of a suit 
in any inferior court, commanding them to cease from 
the prosecution thereof, upon a suggestion that either 
the cause origionally, or some collateral matter 
arising therein, does not belong to that jurisdiction, 
but to the cognizance of some oraher court." William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of Engl~"'ld, vol. J, 
{Oxford, 1758), p. 112. Hereinafter cited as: Black-
stone, Commentaries. 
7 
before the High Commission until the judges had 
determined that the case raised a spiritual question 
and did not fall within temporal jurisdiction. Thus 
the courts of common law claimed an unqualified 
superiority, for they asserted their right to decide 
J 
the limits of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
The church in these conflicts would usually 
sue for tithes to the church, and the defendant would 
apply for redress to the courts of common law. Then. 
if the church brought suit in the common law court, 
the defendant would be entitled to a trial by jury. 
Since the jury would ordinarily consist of fellow farmers 
who might find themsel~·es in the same position, there 
. 4 . 
was little doubt of an innocent verdict. To stem this 
erosion of the High Commission's power, in 160.5 Arch-
bishop Bancroft presented complaints to the Star Chamber 
in the form of twenty-five elaborate articles of 
grievances against the common law courts. Bancroft 
seems to have been willing to have placed the total 
power of prohibition in the hands of the Courts of 
Chancery, but the common law judges, who were aware 
that Chancery was more political in nature, declareds 
J. J. R • Tanner , ;::;E""'n'"'"g'"'"'l .... i.... s.._h...._.__.~--=---~~=;;.-..;-=~ 
flicts of the Seventeenth Centur (Cam-
bridge, 19 7 , p. 3 . Hereinafter cited as: Tanner, 
Constitutional Conflicts. 
4. Hastings Lyon and Herman Block, Edward Coke: 
Oracle of the Law. (Boston, 1929), p. 17J. Hereinafter 
cited as: Lyon, Oracle of the Law. 
8 
No man maketh any question but that both 
the jurisdictions are lawfully and justly 
in his Majesty, and if any abuses be, they 
ought to be reformed; but what the law doth 
warrant in cases of prohibitions to keep 
every jurisdiction in his true limits, 
is not be said an gbuse, nor can be altered 
but by Parliament,) 
This effectually silenced the Archbishop, who knew 
how little he had to hope from the Commons. But it 
was this appeal to parliament which raised this juris-
dictional dispute to the "dignity of a constitutional 
6 
event." 
The dispute simmered until 1607, when a new law 
dictionary by Jorill Cowell, entitled The Interpreter, 
. 
dedicated to Bancroft, defined the word "king" as 
follows: "He is above the law by his absolute power; he 
may alter or suspend any particular law that seemeth 
7 
hurtful to the public estate." This claim of royal 
power was commensurate with Bancroft's appeal to the 
vanity of James by urging him to endorse this definition 
of his powers as monarch. 
The entire affair was brought to a head when 
a Puritan lawyer, Nicholar Fuller, was imprisoned for 
contempt for insulting the bishops, while trying a 
5. J.R. Tanner ed., Qonstitutional Documents 
of the Reign of James I: A.D. 1603-1625 with an Historical 
Commentarx (Cambridge, 19JO), p. 178. Hereinafter 
cited as: Tanner, Constitutional Documents. 
6. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 2, p. J6. 
7, For a complete view of the theories of the 
9 
case before the Court of High Commission. Fuller then 
applied for a writ of prohibition, which infuriated 
James, who declared that if Fuller escaped punishment 
he would call the Council before him and censure the 
common law justices in person. The twelve judges met 
to discuss the point of law and maintained the right 
of the common law judges to prevent the High Commis-
sion from deciding the legality of its own acts; but 
they also expressly acknowledged its claim to punish 
schism and heresy. The judges, though at first inclined 
to defend Fuller by a writ of prohibition, saw the need 
to satisfy the king's objections. They avoided a con-
frontation witn James on the technical grounds that 
Fuller's words fell within the scope of the High Com-
mission's power to punish schism and heresy, and 
8 
denied Fuller the writ. Archbishop Bancroft was not 
satisfied by the legal maneuvers of the judges and 
appealed directly·to the king, because the decision had 
not succeeded in stopping the flood of prohibitions; it 
had only side stepped a head-on collision. 
author of The Interpreter see: S.B. Chrimes, "The Con-
stitutional Ideas of Dr. John Cowell," English Historical 
Review 64 (1949):461-487. . 
8. Sir Edward Coke,The Twelveth Part of Certain 
Select Cases in Law Reported bv Sir Edward Coke, Rt. Late 
Lord Chief Justice of En land and One of His Ilia· estv' s 
Council of State London,17J8J,p. • Hereinafter cited as: 
Coke, The Twelveth Part of Certain Select Cases •••• 
Willson, James VI and I, p. 258. Gardiner, History of 
England, vol.2,p.40. 
10 
The king then summoned Coke and some of the 
other judges to Whitehall to discuss the general question 
with the ecclesiastical lawyers. James saw himself as 
an arbitrator to decide the issues. In his own words 
he declared: 
The King is the Supreme judges inferior judges his shadows and ministers ••• and the 
king may, if he pleases, sit and judge in 
Westminister Hall in any Court there, and 
call their Judgements in question •••• The 
King being the author of 9the Laws is the 
interpreter of the Laws. 
It can clearly be seen, that at this point, James had 
definite predetermined ideas concerning his authority 
over the two opposing sides. This is further bolstered 
by his opening statement to the session: 
When the controversy ariseth to the subjects 
of both parts; namely when the controversy 
ariseth upon the jurisdiction of my Courts 
of ordinary justice; and because I am the 
Head of justice immediately under God ••• 
I thought that it stood with the office of 
a King, which God hath committed to me, to 
hear the Controversy between the Bishops 
and other of his Clergy, and the Judges of 
the Laws of England, and to take Order 
cthatJ the one does not encroach u~on the 
other, but that every of them, hold them-
selves within their natural and local jurisdiction.10 
9. Roland Usher, "James I and Sir Edward Coke," 
English Historical Review 18 (1903):664. Hereinafter 
cited as : Usher,"James I and Coke." 
10.Sir Edward Coke, The Thirteenth Part of 
Certain Select Cases in Law Reported by Sir Edward Coke, 
Rt. Late Lord Chief Justice of England and One of His 
Majesty's Council of State (London,1738),p.JB. 
Hereinafter cited as : Coke, The Thirteenth Part of 
Certain Select Cases ••.• 
11 
As the meeting wore on, James became irate at 
some speeches he considered offensive, especially when 
Sir Edward Coke said that "the common law protecteth 
the King." James retortedv1 . 
A traitorous speech! The King protecteth 
the laws and not the laws the King. The 
King maketh Judges and Bishops. If the 
Judges interpret the laws themselves and 
suffer none else to interpret, then they 
may errily make, of the laws, shipmen's 
hose. 
Sir Edward describes what happened next: 
Then the King said that he thought the 
law was founded upon reason and that he 
and others had reason as well as the judges. 
To which it was answered by me that true 
it was Gqd cthatJ had endowed his Majesty 
with excellent science and great endowments 
of nature, but his Majesty was not learned 
in the laws of his realm of England, and 
causes which concern the life, or inheritance, 
or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, 
are not to be decided by natural reason 
but by the artificial reason and judgement 
of law, which law is an act which required 
long study and experience before that a 
man can attain to the cognizance of it; 
and that the law was the golden metwant and 
a measure to try the causes of the subjects, 
and which protected his Majesty in safety 
and peace: with which the King was greatly 
offended, and said that then he should be 
under the law, which was treason to affirm, 
(as he said)s to which I said that Bracton 
saith Q.!!QQ Rex !lQ!! debet ~ .fil!Q homine, 
11. John Nichols, "Letter of Mr. Chamberlain 
to Dudley Carleton," The Progresses, Processions, and 
Ma ificent Festivities of K. James First, vol. 2, 
London, 1828), p. 210. Hereinafter cited as: Nichols, 
The Progresses ••• of King James I. Usher sees the 
account used here, by Sir Julius Caesar, as being 
the most accurate report of the conflict between James 
and Coke. Usher, "James I and Coke," p. 669. There 
are no less than four separate accounts of the meeting. 
Ibid., p. 669. . 
12 
~ sub Deo et Lege. cthat the king should 
not be 1~nder man, but under God and the laws. J 
In deference to the unanimous opinion of his 
judges, James did not again~allow himself to be allured 
lJ 
by the vision of an English King Solomon. It is clear 
that Coke and his fellow judges gave a new turn to the 
theory of the subordination of church to state ex-
pressed in the preamble to Henry VIII's Statute of 
Appeals. It would seem that, in their eyes, the church. 
and its courts were subject not only to the royal 
supremacy, but also to the control of the common law. 
Whether such an interpretation carried out the intention 
of Henry VIII is more than doubtful. Also, of partic-
ular importance in this struggle was the insistance of 
Coke upon the exclusive right of parliament to change 
12. Tanner, Constitutional Conflicts, p. J6-
37. Coke never lost his reverence for the law and the 
experience that was required to master it. "The 
knowledge of the law is like a deepe well, out of which 
each man draweth according to the strength of his 
understanding. He that reachest deepest, he seeth 
the amiable and admirable secrets of the law, wherein, 
I assure you,,-, the sages of the law in former times 
have had the deepest reach. And as the bucket in the 
depth is easily drawne to the uppermost part of the 
water, but take it from the water it cannot be drawn 
. up but with a great difficultie; so abeit· beginnings 
of this study seems difficult, yet when the professor 
of law can dive into this depth it is delightful, 
easie, and without heavey burthen, so long as he 
keeps himself in his own proper element." Gist, 
"The Writings of Sir Edward Coke," p. 532. 
13. Coke, The Twelveth Fart of Certain Select 
/ "5 Cases .•• , p. oJ-o. 
13 
the laws of England. a.Yld his vigorous opposition to 
claims of any right, even by the king, to change the 
laws of the l~nd. The result of the victory of Coke's 
views was to fix firmly these doctrines in English 
14 
law. 
The most controversial judicial dictum of Coke's 
life came in the case involving Dr. Thomas Bonham, a 
London physician. Dr. Bonham was practicing medicine 
without a certificate from the Royal College of Physicians, 
which was empowered by statute to fine and imprison 
any unlicensed practitioners, with half the fine going 
15 
to the crown and the other to the college. The 
college censors arrested Bonham and put him in the 
Fleet, whereupon he brought action for false imprison-
ment. The censors' defense centered around the 
argument they were only following statutory law as 
prescribed by parliament. 
Coke first noted that the statute gave the 
college one half of each fine collected, thus making 
the censors at once judge and party to every case they 
brought to court. This, explained Coke, contradicted 
a maxim of the common laws No man ought to be a judge 
in his own case: "Aliguis !lQ!1 de bet esse ,judex in 
14. w.s. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 
vol. 5, (London, 1945), p. 471. Hereinafter cited as: 
Holdsworth, History of English Law. 
15. Theodore F. Plucknett, '"Bonham's Case and 
Judicial Review," Harvard Law Review 40 (1926): J2. 
Hereinafter cited as: Fluclmett, .. Bonham's Case.'" 
14 
16 
propria causa." 
On the question of party and judge in the same 
case, the statute should have been disallowed, but Coke 
felt the necessity of curbing the rising arrogance of 
both crown and parliament. In solution Coke used the 
17 
idea of a fundamental law which limited both indif-
ferently. In short, Coke was aiming at an independent 
judiciary powerful enough to bring both king and parlia-
18 
ment into line when he delivered the rest of the 
opinion: 
And it appears in our books, that in many 
cases the common law will control acts of 
Parliament, and sometimes adjuge them to 
be utterly void; for when an act is against 
common right and reason, or repugnant, or 
impossible to be preformed, the common 
law will controt9it, and adjudge such an act to be void. 
It would be very hazardous to assume that we 
can accurately reconstruct the court's sentiment upon 
the subject of voiding laws passed by parliament, and 
16. Ibid., p. )4. 
17. When the people in the seventeenth century 
talked about a fundamental law they meant the rights 
which existing law gave them, and that the supremacy of 
law in England meant the supremacy of a law which 
parliament could change. Holdsworth, History of Eng-
lish Law, vol. 2, p. 441; vol. 4, p. 187. 
18. J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English 
Constitutional History (Oxford, 1955), p. Jl. Herein-
after cited as: Gough, Fundamental Law. 
19. R.A. MacKay, "Coke--Parliamentary Sover-
eignth or the Supremacy of the Law?," Michigan Law 
Review 22 (1923): 222. Hereinafter cited as: Mackay, 
"Parliamentary SoYereignty." 
15 
herein lies the basic constitutional conflict involved 
in the Bonham Case. Despite Coke's worship of the com-
mon law and his sincere belief that it was more reason-
able, more just than any statute which may set it 
aside, and despite the opinion that parliament was 
frequently a meddlesome powerful and sometimes ignorant 
body, he had never declared the common law beyond 
parliament's reach. He, instead, spoke of correcting 
the law, yet it is hardly conceivable that if he had 
any idea of a law beyond the power of parliament, or 
so perfect that it could not legally be changed, Coke 
. 20 
would have omitted to mention the fact, When he wrote 
that the common law would "control 0 -:an act of parliament, 
Coke meant that the courts would interpret it in such 
a way as not to conflict with the accepted principles 
of reason and justice which were presumed to underlie 
21 
all law. Also,. "common right and reason~· does not 
refer to any particular body of law, but seems to point 
conclusively to common sense or the general reason-
ableness of the law, and nothing else; but it must 
be remembered that it is the common sense of those 
learned in the law, or to use Coke's own words, the 
22 
"artificial reason" of the law. 
20. Ibid., p. 220-221. 
21. Gough, Fundamental Law, p. J5. 
22. ffiacKay, "Parliamentary Sovereignty," 
p. 229. 
16 
There had been some doubt about what Coke 
meant by "repugnant.'' In his judgment in Rowles \IS. 
2) 
Mason, delivered shortly after (and L~ reference to) 
Dr. Bonham's Case, Coke suggests that by repugnant he 
meant something comparable if not equivalent to "un-
24 
reasonable." A repugnancy, then, is a contradiction; 
it occurs when a statute provides one thing, and then 
25 
through oversight perhaps, creates its opposite. 
When he spoke of "adjudging an act void," 
he did not mean that the court could declare it to have 
been beyond the power of parliament to enact, but that 
the court cou~d construe it strictly, if this were 
necessary to bring it_ into conformity with recognized 
principles. An act could not be declared unconstitutional 
in the modern sense, but, in short, this opinion gave 
26 
the right of strict construction in the courts. The 
general opinion of constitutional scholars is that Coke 
23. "If there be repugnancy in statute or un-
reasonableness in custom, the common law dissallows and 
rejects it, as it appears by Dr. Bonham's Case." 
Rowles ~ Mason, 2 Brownlow 198. 
24. Gough, Fu..~damental Law, p. 36-37. 
25 •. Though not technically a repugnancy, certain-
ly a statute making a man judge his own case and a.self-
contradictory statute might well be regarded as cognate, 
and as Coke presented his precedents on statutes re-
pugnant and statutes impossible to be performed, his 
theory of a statute against common right and reason took 
form. S.E. Thorne, "Dr. Bonhar:i.'s Case," Law Quarterl~ 
Review 54 (19J8)s 549. 
26. Gough, Fundamental Law, P• 35· MacKay, 
"Parliamentary Sovereignity," P• 229. 
17 
was here attempting to appeal to natural law, or 
27 
higher law, or fundamental law. 
Coke, himself, did not take the concept of 
28 
strict construction of the /law lightly. He wrote: 
The laws of England consist of three parts. 
The Common law, customs, and acts of Parlia-
ment: for any fundamental point of the ancient 
laws and customs of the realm, it is a maxim 
. in policy, and a trial by experience, that 
the alteration of any of them is most danger-
ous; for that which hath been refined and per-
fected by all the wisest men in former suc-
cession of ages, and proved and approved by 
continual experience to be good and p~o-
f i table for the commonwealth, cannot without 29 
great hazard and danger be altered or changed. 
Therefore, to Coke the common law had to be found, not 
made, but it was not Coke who developed and expounded 
upon his theory, but generations of later judges and 
lawYers. His views were in conformity with Chief 
Justice Hobart, who in 1615, claimed broad power in 
judicial review: "If.you ask me, then, by what rule the 
judges guided themselves in this diverse exposition.of 
the self same work and sentence? I answer, it was by 
that liberty and authority that judges have over laws, 
27. Frederick Pollock, The Expansion of the Com-
mon Law (London, 1904), P• 122. 
28. Maitland states that Coke distinctly claims 
that the judges may hold a statute void, either because 
it is against reason and natural law, or because it 
trenches on the royal prerogative. c8 Report 118: But 
this view may not have been Coke's at the time of the 
Bonham decision.J F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional 
pistory of England: A Course of Lectures (Cambridge, 
1908), P• JOO. 
29. !11ac kay, "Far liamentary Sovere igni ty," p. 21 7. 
18 
especially over statute laws, according to reason and 
JO 
best convenience, to mold them to the best use •••• " 
But the issue of judicial review was not set-
tled quickly, for even Blackstone seems to have changed 
his mind on the subject. In the 1765 edition of his 
Commentaries he stated: 
Lastly acts of parliament that are irnpossib~ 
to be performed are of no validity; and if 
there arise out of them collaterally any 
absurb consequences, manifestly to common 
reason, they are, with regard to those col-
lateral consequences void •••• if parliament 
will positively enact a th·ing to be done which 
is unreasonable, I know no power that can 
controll it: and the examples usually alledged 
in support of this sense of the rule do none 
of them ~oye that. where the main object of 
a statute is unreasonable the judges are at 
liberty to reject it; for that. were to set 
the judicial power above that of the legis-
lature, which would be subversive to all 
government ••• there is no court thrt has the 
power to defeat the legislature.J · 
In 1765, Blackstone opposed the theory of judicial 
review, but there is a note, said to be in Blackstone's 
own hand, found in the margin of a copy of the 1778 
edition, which when injected into the text, makes the 
third sentence read: "But the Parliament will positively 
enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know 
of no power Jin ordinary forms of the Constitution that 
J2 
is vested with authority' to control it .. " Though 
JO. Plucknett, "Bonham's Cas~," P• 50. 
31. Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. 1, (Oxford, 
1765), p. 91. 
32. Plucknett, "Bonham's Case, .. P• 60. 
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the wording here is extremely vague, many American 
legal historians suggest that these qualifying words, 
JJ 
found printed in the posthumous editions, show Black-
34 
stone supporting Coke's theory. 
In general, many American writers, lawyers 
and historians, have judged Coke's theory more sympa-
thetically because they have seen in his attitude an 
important and interesting forerunner of the principle 
of judicial review, which though rejected in England, 
came to fulfillment in the United States. English 
lawyers, on the other hand, while accepting this inter-
pretation of C.oke' s intention, have treated his efforts 
as·an ill-judged excursion from the main current of 
English legal development, which fortunately came to 
nothing and let it flow, majestic and unimpeded, into 
the modern doctrine of legislative sovereignty. These 
critics have treated Coke's remarks as "dicta," uncal.led 
35 
for and unessential to the case he was trying. But 
no matter which view one takes, English or American, 
fevr<'Will argue that it was in the Middle Ages and in the 
slxteenth century that the lawyers helped make the English 
33. This wording is definitely printed in the 
1786 edition. Blackstone, Commentaries,· vol. 1, (London, 
1 7 86 ) , p • 96 • 
J4. Josiah Quincy, Quincy Reports of Cases Are:ued 
and Adjudged in the Suuerior Court of Judicature of the 
Province of Massachusetts Bay Between 1761 §Ild 1772 
(Boston, 1865), p. 526. 
J5. Gough, Fundamental Law, p. )2. 
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parliament an effective representative assembly. 
Seventeenth century parliaments handsomely repaid this 
debt by helping Coke maintain the medieval conception 
of the supremacy of law, and apply it to the government 
of a modern state. In this matter England became a 
model both to the framers of the constitutions in the 
continental countries and the United States. Through 
this evolution, the Supreme Court of the United States 
became the body which safeguards, more effectually 
than any other tribunal in the world, Coke's ideal of 
J6 
the supremacy of the law. 
By 1610, another important conflict had arisen 
over the issue of government by proclamation. There 
were cases in which the king had the right to issue 
proclamations which had the force of law. But these 
cases were restricted to invasion, internal rebellion, 
or when the danger was so imminent that parliament could 
37 
not be consulted. The problem was that the parliaments 
failed to stop the royal encroachment on their authori-
J8 
ty. In the seven years of his reign, James I had 
J6. Holdsworth, Some Makers of English Law, 
. P• 1J1, 
37. Francis S. Sullivan, Lectures on the Con-
stitution and Laws of England with a Commentary on Magna 
Charta, and Illustrations of fllany of the English Statutes, 
vol. 1, (Portland, 1805), p. J21. 
JS. Matthew Hale, The Analysis of the Law: 
Being a Scheme, or Abstract, of the.several.Titles. and 
Partitions of the Law of England, digested in Method 
(London, 1716), p. 12. Blackstone summarized the situat-
21 
expedited more proclamations than Elizabeth had in the 
39 
entire last thirty years of her reign. This contro-
versy simmered until 1610, when there was a poor wheat 
harvest and James restricted the use of wheat in making 
starch while the Commons still had the matter under 
legislative consideration. 
In response to the king's action, the Commons 
petitioned James: 
••• that all impositions set without the assent 
of Parliament be quite abolished and taken away; 
and that your Majesty, in imitation likewise 
of your noble progenitors, will be pleased, that 
a law may be made during this session of Parlia-
ment, to declare that all impositions set or 
to be set upon your people, their goods or me~­
chandise,. save only by co~on assent in Parliament, 
are and shall be void •••• 
James took no immediate action on the Common's 
petition but waited until Coke returned from riding 
circuit to request an opinion from the judges •. The Lord 
Chancellor advised the judges to "maintain the power and 
ion: .. It must be however remarked that (particularly in 
his later years cHenry VIII 3 ) the royal prerogative was 
then strained to a very t{,r'annical and oppresive height1 
and, what was the work of circumstance, its encroachments 
were established by law under the sanction of those 
pusillanimious parliaments, one of which to its eternal 
disgrace passed a statute, whereby it was inacted that 
the King's proclamations should have force of acts of 
parliament." Blackstone, Commentaries, v_ol. 4, (1758), 
p. 424. 
39· Rule by proclamation had been a problem 
under Elizabeth, but never to the magnitude of James' 
reign. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, p. J19. 
40. G.W. Prothero ed., Select Statutes and 
other Constitutional Documents Illustrative of t:lizabeth 
and James I (Oxford, 1898), P• )02. 
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prerogative of the king; and in cases in which there is 
no authority and precedent, to leave it to the king 
to order it according to his wisdom ••• otherwise the 
41 
king would be no more than the Duke of Venice •••• " 
But Sir Edward had his own view of the situation: 
When the authority and precedent is wanting, 
there is a need of great consideration 
before anything of novelty shall be est-
ablished, and to provide that this be not 
against the law of the land;;for I said 
that the King cannot change any part of 
the common law, nor create an offense by 
his proclamation which was ~~t an offense 
before, without parliament. 
Once again the weight of Coke's view carried the ~udges, 
who ruled that.the king could not create any offense by 
his proclamation •. He could only admonish his subjects 
to keep the law. Nor could he, by proclamation, make 
.offenses punishable in the Star Chamber which were not 
by law under the jurisdiction of that court. That there 
might be no doubt of the opinion, the judges "formally 
declared that the King had no prerogative but that which 
43 
the law of the land allowed him." 
41. Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 4, 
P• J96. 
42. Henry Hallam, The Constitutional Historx 
of En land from .the Accession of Henr VII to the 
Death of George II, vol. 1, New York, 18 , p. JJl. 
Hereinafter cited as: Hallam, Constitutional History. 
43. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 2, p. 
104. This decision was a severe blow to James, for in 
his The Trew Law of Free Monarchies he wrote that the 
kin~ could make both statutes and ordinances without 
"any advice of Parliament or Estates." James felt he 
needed no power, save his own to enact laws. 
2J 
The king meekly accepted the adverse decision, 
but, as usual, made no concession with respect to the 
Ecclesiastical Commission, and evaded some of their 
other requests, but promised that his proclamations would 
44 
go no further than warranted by law. 
Coke and the Commons had gained their point. 
Their decision would stand. In a few words, Coke had 
again set forth salient features of the constitution. 
James did not forget Coke's actions against the 
crown. By April ?, 1613, there was a vacancy on the :King's 
Bench and Francis Bacon immediately recommended that.Coke 
be appointed to the position of Chief Justice. Coke 
opposed this promotion because he lmew that it would 
remove him from the position of being arbitrator between 
the crown and subject. James was determined to remove 
his antagonist from the Common Pleas and Coke was f orceu 
to accept the promotion. This upward promotion of Coke 
has been accepted by the majority of historians as an 
attempt by James to deter others from offending the crown 
as Sir Edward had so often done. But to the king's 
chagrin, this "penal promotion" did not silence the 
lawyer for long. 
In a contest -which threatened the judges' 
professional dignity and personal income, Coke's col-
leagues were willing enough to follow ftis leadi but 
44. Hallam, Constitutional Historv, vol. 1, p. 324. .. 
24 
when he launched himself into a personal battle with King 
James, they predictable abstained. The gulf between Coke 
and his fellow judges emerged in 1615, in Peacham's 
case, where Coke insisted, in the face of established 
custom and precedent, that the king had no right to 
consult the judges individually before they tried a 
4_5 
case. 
Edmund Peacham, Rector of Hinton St. George, in 
Somerset, was frequently in trouble with the authorities 
because of his Puritan sympathies, and was finally im-
prisoned because of some intemperate accusations made 
against his bishop. While in prison, his house was 
searched and some rough notes for a ser..mon ·. were··found 
which read: 
The people might rise in rebellion against 
these new taxes ••• all the King's officers 
ought to be put to the sword, and when 
Prince Charles assumed the throne, might 
not the people say, Come, this is the heir, 
let us kill him? King James had promised 
mercy and judgement, but we find neither. 
It is the duty of preachers to lay open the 
infirmities of princes and let them see 
their evil ways •••• on a sudden the King 
might be stricken with death, perhaps 46 
within eight days, as Ananias or Nabal. 
James read these words and old fears enveloped 
him. The royal bed was moved against th~ wall and bar-
ricaded with feather mattresses. James ~eared a conspir-
45. J.P. Kenyon, ed., The Stuart Constitution: 
1603-1688: Documents and Commentary (Cambridge, 1966), 
p. 97. 
46. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, p. 351. 
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acy, so he ordered Peacham examined under the manacles. 
He was put to the rack and examined with various inter-
rogations, "before torture, between torture and after 
48 
torture," He would implicate no one and justified his 
, I 
conduct by saying that' it was by the examples "of 
preachers and chronicles cthat 3 king's infirmities 
49 
should be laid open." 
James then decided that before bringing Peacham 
to open trial, it would be wise to consult the judges sin-
gly, to reveal their true opinions, and to minimize 
Coke's effect. Also, Attorney-General Bacon felt that 
the prosecutio!1 had to be successful to prevent outbreaks 
of civil disorder incited by writings like Peacham's. 
He ~eared that if Peacham's writings were not held to be 
treasonable, the country would be flooded with sedi-
tious writings. There can be no doubt that Bacon sought 
47. Though the common law expressly rejected 
the use of torture, it was generally understood that the 
Council had the right of obtaining information by this 
means, whenever the needed evidence was sufficiently 
important to render it necessary to appeal to such a mode 
of extracting a secret. Gardiner; History of England, 
vol. 2, p. 275. Holdsworth feels that anyone who is 
familiar with the character of the continental criminal 
procedure will agree that the eventual elimination of 
torture from the English criminal code, which was a 
·result of the victory of the commons law, far outweighs 
the disadvantages that victory might have entailed. 
Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 5, p. 170-176. 
48. Hallam, Constitutional History, vol. 1, p. 
331 ... 
49. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 2, 
P• 273. 
Z6 
to protect only the interests of the crown and not 
merely to prosecute a vendetta against the unlucky 
50 
Peacham. 
Therefore, Bacon approached each of the judges 
and asked his opinion concerning the case. Through 
three meetings, Coke remained steadfast. He refused to 
give his opinion declaring that "'this auricular taking 
of opinions, single and apart, was new and dangerous; 
51 
and other words more vehement than I repeat. 'n Final-
ly, during the fourth meeting, Coke delivered the 
opinion--but not the verdict that Bacon expected--
that Peacham was not guilty. There were two basic 
issues upon which Cbke questioned the treasonable nature 
of Peacham: (1) the work was never set to print, and 
(2) the writing as it stood was not treason in any 
sense of the word. Coke -:-boldly asserted that no mere 
declaration of the king's unworthiness to govern amount-
52 
ed to treason. 
50. Willson, James VI and I, P• J80. Gardiner, 
History of England, vol. 2, P• 277 and 280. 
51. Tanner, Consti'tutional Conflicts, p. 39. 
Coke is wrong because it was'"'.Tlot an innovation to consult 
. the judges in this manner. "There had been many 
instances of it, as in Sir Walter Raleigh'.s case, where 
Coke knew the judges had been.consulted, and other cases 
in Elizabeth's reign. HaTl-am, Constitutional History, 
vol, 1, P• 337 and 343. 
52. Gardiner, Hist..ory of England, vol. ·2, p. 
279, It seems that Coke ·ci10se to overlook the 1351 
Statute of Treasons in hk. ;op.inion and is therefore 
incorrect in his concluSinrm ·.as drawn here. 
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James expressed his fury at Coke's refusal to 
capitulate: 
That his writing of this libel is an overt 
act, the judges themselves do confess: that 
it was made for publication, the form of it 
betrays the self; that he kept not these 
papers in a secret and safe fashion but in-
an open house and lidless cask, both him-
self and the messenger do confess •••• ~ray, 
he confesses that in the end he meant 
to preach it •••• 
The only question that r.emains then is, 
whether it may be verified and proved that 
by the publishing of this sermon, or rather 
libel of his, he compasses or imagined the 
King's death •••• So the only thing the Judges' 
can doubt is of the delinquent's intention; 
and then the question will be, whether if 
these reasons be stronger to enforce the 
guiltine~s of his intention, or his base 
denial to clear him, since nature teaches 
every man to defend his life as long as he 
may .••• 53 
In view of Coke's strong rebuke, James through 
Bacon, did not bring Peacham before the Court of King's 
Bench, but sent him to trial at Taunton where the out-
spoken preacher was sentenced to death for treason. 
Before sentence could be carried out, Peacham died from 
54 
his torture and the unhealthy conditions in the jail;.. 
53. Tanner, Constitutional Documents, p. 191-
192. It was James who was correct in asserting that 
Peacham had committed treason. It is treason to "compass 
or imagine the death of the King." Statute of Treasons 
1351, 25 Edward III stat. 5, chap. 2. 
54. James was to hold this opinion against Coke. 
In 1616, Coke's offenses against the crown, entitled 
Innovations into the Laws and Government, records one 
charge that referred directly to the Peacham case. 
It charged that Coke felt that "no ~ords of scandal 
or defanation, importing that the King was utterly unable 
or unworthy to goYern, were treason," Bowen, Lion and 
the Throne, p. 387. 
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Even though Peacham was found guilty, it was in 
1615, that Coke laid down the maxim that it was contrary 
to the law to ask judges separately to give their 
opinions whether certain acts charged against an accused 
person amounted to high treason. It would have to wait 
until a later day, when he was no longer judge, for 
Coke to object to the entire practice of consulting the 
judges in any manner concerning pending decisions. When 
55 
Sir Edward wrote his Institutes in 1628, he was 
totally opposed to any outside interference with the 
judicial process. The maxim of the independence of the 
judiciary bec~me so engrained in English constitutional 
development that no king since the fall of the Star 
.. 56 
Chamber has soµght "to act as judge." 
Since Coke had been appointed to the bench, he 
had been a thorn in James'.side. In the year 1616, 
Coke led a determined but unsuccessful resistance to an 
55. Coke gives this advice to judges: "And 
you honourable and reverend Judges and Justices, that do, 
or shall sit in the High Tribunals or Seats::of Justice, 
feare not to do right at all, and to deliver your 
opinions justly according to the Law; for feare is 
nothing, but a betraying of the succours that reason 
can afford, and if you shall sincerely execute justice, 
be assured of three things: First, though some may 
maligne you, yet God will give you his blessing. Second-
ly, that though you may offend Great men ·and Favourites, 
yet you shall have the favourable kindness of the 
Almighty, and be his F~vourites.against ~11 scandalous 
complaints and pragmaticall devices. Ana, lastly, God 
will defend you as with a shield." James, Coke: His 
Family, p. 35· 
56. Maitland, Constitutional History, p. 270, 
438, and 479. 
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attempt by the crown to delay proceedings in a case 
where the royal prerogative was concerned. Coke's 
position in the case of the Commendam_~was so bold a 
bre:ak with James that "the Lord Coke fell in disfavor ••• 
57 
and many men feared it would be his utter overthrow." 
The case began when Bishop Neile was given the 
land in the See of Lichfield in commendam, but this ap-
pointment was disputed by two other persons who claimed 
that the presentation was theirs and not the king's. The 
two, Colt and Glover, carried the case before the 
Exchequer Chamber where they questioned the kjng's right 
to make presen~ations in commendam at all. ·At this 
58 
point James intervened in defense of his prerogative. 
The king instructed Attorney-General Bacon .to 
communicate with Coke and the other judges. On April 
25, 1616, Bacon wrote Coke: 
The day appointed for the further proceedings 
by arguments of the judges in that case, be 
put off until His Majesty's further pleasure 
57. Nichols, "Letter from Lord Chamberlain to 
Dualey Carleton, June 8, 1616," The Progresses ••• of King 
James I, vol. J, p. 171. · 
58. Tanner, Constitutional Conflicts, p. J9. 
To James a law was an expression of the king's will. The 
king was the supreme interpreter of the law,· the great 
judge from whom inferior judges dr~w their aut~ority and 
competence •. "'Kings are properly Judges, and Judgement 
properly belongs to them from God: for Kings sit on 
the throne of God and hence all judgement is derived.'" 
He saw other judges ~s deputies of the kin9. ~h~ king 
could sit and judge in any court an~ call its JUagments 
in question according to James. Willson, James·vr 
and r. p. 257. James carried this view to his grave. 
JO 
be known upon consulting with him and to that 
end that your Lordship forthwith signif~ His 
commandment to the rest of the Judges.5~ 
The twelve judges assembled and discussed Bacon's 
letter. On April 27, in a letter signed by all twelve 
justices, they answered the king's request: 
We ••• hold it our duties to inform your Majesty 
that our oath is in these express words: That 
in case of any letters come unto us contrary 
to law, that we do nothing by such letters, 
but certify your Majesty thereof, and go forth 
to do the law, notwithstanding the same let-
ters. We have advisedly considered of the 
same to be contrary to law, and such as we 
could not yield to the same by our oath •••• 
And therefore knowing your Majesty's zeal 
to justice, we have, according to our oaths 
and duties (at the day openly prefixed the last 
term) proceeded, and thereof certified your 
Majesty; and shall ever pray to the Almighty 
for your Majesty in all honou5~ health and 
happyness long reign over us. u 
Again James had interfered, but now the judges stood 
firm~. The bench not only "certified" that they were go-
ing ahead with the trial despite royal orders, but the 
trial had already been held before the judges wrote their 
letter. 
In answer, James assured the judges that he had 
no wish to interfere with justice, but that in the present 
case he was in essence a party and therefore should 
enjoy the same consideration as the other parties. He 
went on to remind the justices that the practice of 
delaying a trial was common and he requested that he be 
59. Lyon, Oracle of the Law, p. 201. 
60. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, p. 371. 
Jl 
61 
given such a delay when he was party. 
But James was not beaten so quickly. On the 
sixth of June, he summoned all the judges to Whitehall. 
,/, 
James presided over the meeting and did much of the 
talking. When given a chance to defend their actions, 
the Lord Chief Justice contended that Bacon's letter was 
a delay of justice and contrary to law and their oath. 
Coke further stated that the case (as the judges saw 
it) did not concern the king's prerogative of grant of 
commendams, and that they could not adjourn the case 
because Bacon's letter showed no certain date and 
62 
adjournment must always be to a certain day. 
James had no difficulty in answering that the 
judges might easily have fixed any day they pleased, and 
that, when it arrived, if they had not yet had time to 
confer with him, they might have adjourned the case again. 
He then asserted that they had no right to decide be-
fore consulting him, in order that he might know whether 
the question concerned his prerogative or not. Further, 
James wanted to know Chancellor Ellesmere's opinion on 
. 63 
the bounds of the judges' oath. 
61. Gardiner, Historv of England, vol. J, p. 16. 
62. Tanner, Constitutional Documents, P• 195. 
6J. Ellesmere concurred with Bacon;s opinion 
that the oath of the judges bound them to give counsel 
to the king whenever they were called upon to do so, and 
if they refused to ~o so! then it w~s "mor~ than_~ 
simple refusal to give him counsel. Gardiner, Historv 
of England, vol. J, P• 17. 
}2 
Having been reinforced by Chancellor Ellesmere's 
opinion, James asked each of the judges, one by one, 
"whether if at any time a case depending before ·the 
/ judges which his Majesty cortceived to concern him either 
in power or profit, and thereupon required to consult with 
them, and that they should stay proceedings in the mean-
64 
time--they ought not to stay accordingly?" All twelve, 
save Coke, meekly promised to uphold the royal pre-
rogative and agreed to stop any barrister who presumed 
even to question it. Coke said for an answer, .. that I 
would do that which an honest and just Judge ought to 
65 
do," 
This open rebuke of James' authority and the 
crown was the incident that made James decide to take 
action against the impertinent Coke. In late June, Coke 
was called before the Privy Council to answer three 
articles of accusation. First, that he had concealed 
a sum of twelve thousand pounds due the crown from the 
late Chancellor Hatton. Secondly, that while sitting 
on the bench, he had uttered words of very high contempt, 
saying that the common law would be overthronn;.: and 
therein reflecting upon the king. Thirdly, -his uncivil 
and indiscrete carriage in the matter of commendam. 
64. Tanner, Constitutional Conflicts, p. 40. 
65. The account o~ the e~change~as.d~scribed 
above was written by Coke in a le~ter deacribing the 
comrnendam case. James, Coke:His Family, P• J4. 
JJ 
On the first article his defense was so satis-
factory that no more was sa~d of it at the time, and 
Coke afterward obtained a legal decision in his favor. 
The second charge he palliated, without disclaiming the 
66 
words. The third he confessed and prayed forgiveness. 
The immediate affect was that Coke was sequester-
ed from the Council, from riding circuit, and ordered to 
review and correct his Reports, which James felt were in 
67 
many ways faulty and full of novelties of law. These 
measures were no more than temporary harassment, as 
James' real objective was obtained on November 15, 16161 
For certain causes now moving us, we will that 
you shall be no longer our Chief Justice to 
hold the pleas before us, and we command you 
that you no longer interfere in that office, 
and by virtue of these present, we at once68 
remove and exonerate you from this office. 
There was no formal impeachment and no trial, 
and even though Coke was dismissed from the bench, he 
had made his point well known because the common speech 
around the realm was that the "four P's have been over-
thrown and put down--that is Pride, Prohibitions, ~re-
66. Lucy, Aikin, Memoirs of the Court of 
King James the First, vol. 2, (London, 1922), P• 
46. 
67. Nichols, "Letter from Lord Chamberlain to 
Dudley Carleton, July 6, 1616, 11 The Progresses •• ·?f 
King James I, vol. 3, p. 178. There.w:re twenty-eight 
objections to his Reports. Coke suf~1c1ently a.~swered all 
the objections but five and these fi~e answe~s were 
turnea over to James for his evaluation. Ibid., p. 194. 
68. Lyon, Oracle of the Law, P• 207. 
J4 
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munire, and Prerogative." Once again, Coke, through 
defeat, indeed seemed victorious. 
69. Nichols, "Letter from Lord Chamberlain to 
Dudley Carleton, November 14, 1616, 11 The Progresses ••• 
of King James I, vol. J, p. 226. 
CO KE CONT INVcS FROM PARLIAMENT 
James was successful in removing Sir Edward 
1 
Coke from the bench, but this severe blow did not 
diminish his desire to remain in the public limelight. 
In mid-November when Chief Justice Henry Montague asked 
him to sell his official collar for which he now had 
no further use, Coke refused, saying that he would keep 
it for his posterity so that they would know that one of 
2 
their ancestors had been a Chief Justice. This was not 
the only inkling that Sir Edward longed to return to 
public service. In December, hardly a month after his 
dismissal, the rumor circulated in London that Coke had 
traveled to Newmarket to beg a royal audience to suggest 
a marriage between his daughter Frances and Sir John 
J 
Yillers, brother of the king's new favorite. 
Coke envisioned the marriage as a ploy to re-
-
gain the royal ear. He immediately entered into neg-
otiations with Lady. Cornuton, Viller's mother, over the 
.. 4 
amount of the expected dowry. She demanded ten thousand 
1. It is reported that when Coke received the 
word of his dismissal from the bench that he burst into 
tears. Gardiner, History of England, vol. J, p. 84. 
2. John Chamberlain, "Letter of Chamberlain to 
Sir Dudley Carleton, November 23, 1616," The Letters of 
John Chamberlain, ed. Egbert Normai; McClure! vol. 2, 
(Philadeiphia, 1939), p. J8 •. Hereinafter cited as: 
McClure, Letters of Chamberlain. 
J. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, P• J94. 
4. The practice was for the parents to arrange 
marriages, If the couple was attracted to each other, 
so much the betterr if not they could learn to love 
in the school of marriage. Ibid., P• J99· 
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pounds outright, with another one thousand pounds per 
annum while Coke lived. The ex-Chief Justice im-
mediately answered that two-thirds the sum was high 
enough and that he would "not buy the King's favor too 
5 
deare, being so uncertain and variable." 
For several months Coke remained steadfast. Then 
in June o·f 1617, Sir Ralph Winwood, Secretary of State, 
moved to reopen the bargaining. Winwood sent a letter 
to Sir George Villers stating that Coke wanted to re-
gain the royal favor, "'without which he could no longer 
breathe. Sorry for his former disrespectful behavior, 
Sir Edward would be. happy if the proposed marriage con~ 
6 
tract might be renewed •••• '•• The.outrage of several 
months earlier disappeared and Sir Edward agreed to pay 
7 
ten thousand pounds outright for the dowry. 
Now all that Coke had to do was to obtain the 
permission of Lady Hatton, Frances's mother. This was 
easier said than done. Lady Hatton suddenly announced 
that she refused Sir John as her son-in-law. Coke at-
5. McClure, "Letter of Chamberlain to Sir Dudley 
Carleton, March 15, 1617," Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 
2, p. 64. Gardiner, History of England, vol. J, p. 88. 
6. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, p. j99. 
7. If Coke had not been so ambitious, John 
Villers might have married Frances without the dowry. 
His love certainly was not taxed by the knowledge that 
she was to receive 1,300 pounds per annum after the 
death of her parents or the assumption that she would 
not be left penniless before their death. Gardiner, 
History of England, vol. J, P• 87. 
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tempted almost every avenue to persuade his wife to 
consent to the marriage. As a last resort, Winwood went 
to see her and tried to reason but was forced to leave 
with the threat that Frances would be married in spite 
8 
of anything she could do or say. 
Feeling pressed on all sides, Lady Hatton took 
her daughter and fled in secret to Oatlands, near Hampton 
Court. Here Lady Hatton set upon the scheme to forge a 
9 
letter presumed to be from Henry de Vere, the eighteenth 
Earl of Oxford, proposing marriage to Frances. Seeing 
that Frances was receptive to the marriage plans, an 
Obligation was drawn up which Frances signed that agreed 
to the match. 
I vow before God •.• doe gyve myself 
absolutley to Wyffe to Henry Vere 
Viscount ••• to whom I plyghte my trothe 
and inviolate vows to keepe myself 1bill 
Death us do part •••• (10 July 1617) 
The document was kept from her father for some 
time, but when Coke discovered that the two women were 
missing he began to search for their hiding place. 
When their hide-out was discovered, a party led by "fight-
ing Clem Coke," Sir Edward's son, with search warrant 
in hand, took a battering ram and broke the .doors open 
8. Ibid., vol. J, P· 90. 
9, The young Earl was in Venice ~t the time and 
had in fact never seen Frances. Bowen, Lion and the 
Throne, p. 400. 
10. Ibid.,· P• 400. 
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and dragged the two frightened women from each others 
anns. Sir Edward then announced that Frances would 
11 
"come with me to Stoke. " 
Lady Hatton immediately appealed to Francis 
Bacon for aid. Finding him in a meeting, "'she thrust 
in·~with ,them, and desired his Lordship to pardon her 
12 
boldness, but she was like a cow that had lost her calf.'" 
She sought relief through Bacon and it seems that he told 
her that she must apply for a warrant against her husband 
1J 
before the Privy Council. 
In the Council, Lady Hatton accused her estrang-
ed spouse of plotting to kidnap her daughter and carry 
her to France. She also charged him with having an im-
proper warrant by which he broke into the house. To 
this charge, Coke set forth a doctrine of questionable 
logica he asserted that the "rights of a father over 
his child carried with them the right of breaking into 
any .house in which she might happen to be." The 
Attorney-General decided that the Star Chamber could 
14 
more properly handle this unusual plea, but before 
this touchy matter came before the Chamber, Coke and 
11. McClure, "Letter of Chamberlain ·to. Dudley 
Carleton, July 19, 1617," Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 
2, p. 89. 
12. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, P• 401-402. 
13. McClure, "Letter of Chamberlain to Dudley 
Carleton, May 24, 161 7," Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 
2, p. 77. 
14, Gardiner, ,!:listory of England, vol. J, p. 93. 
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Hatton arranged a reconciliation that permitted a 
15 
mutual guardian to keep their daughter. 
By now James was f irrnly in support of the mar-
riage. When the Privy Council attempted to move against 
Secretary Winwoo.d for issuing Coke the search warrant 
without first consulting the other lords. Winwood pulled 
out what proved to be the perfect excuse: a letter from 
the king that sanctioned all his actions in the matter. 
After reading the letter to the Council, he asked them 
to re-direct their accusations. There was no answer 
16 
from the members at the table. Several days later, the 
king personally interceded by commanding Lady Hatton to 
restore her daughter to Sir Edward and "not to again 
entice her away. And the Lady Frances shall not be con-
tracted to anyone without the assent of Sir Edward 
17 
Coke." 
On September 28, 1617, Coke once more took his 
18 
place on the Privy Council, and the following day 
15. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, p. 40J. 
16.. McClure, "Letter of Chamberlain to Dudley 
Carleton, July 19, 1617," Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 
2, p. 89. 
17. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, p. ·405. Mc-
Clure "Letter of Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, August 
9, 16i7," Letters of Chamberlain, vol .. 2, p. 91. 
18. At Council James could employ Coke in 
routine matters and thereby keep a sort of control 
over him. Coke had paid dearly for this symbolic 
position and got nothing more fr?m James. ~ardiner, 
Histor;y of England,. vol. 3, P• 9£4-. Bowen, Lion and 
the Throne, p. 407. 
40 
James gave the bride away at a state wedding celebrated 
19 
at Hampton Court. Coke had indeed gained the royal 
favor but it seems that it was a.~ empty victory. It 
would have been foolhardy for Coke to have expected 
James to reward him with a position from which he, ,could 
possibly attack the crown anew. Sir Edward remained with 
this token position until the parliament of 1621 was 
called. In the House of Commons he began a career 
that would parallel and in some cases exceed the impo~­
tant accomplishments of his tenure on the bench. 
When the 1621 parliament opened, James was 
torn between two opposite lines of policy which 
caused him to become irresolute and hesitating, hoping 
against hope, that the question--war or parliament--
would solve itself. For over two years he ignored the 
pleas of his ministers and did nothing. He would have 
continued to do nothing had not the Spanish invaded the 
20 
Palatinate. 
When parliament opened, the climate was one of 
open concern because of certain "domestic abuses and 
21 
a miserable foreign policy." The king was in no mood to 
19. McClure, "Letter of Chamberlain ·to Dudley 
Carleton, October 11, 1617," Letters of Chamberlain, 
vol. 2, p. 100. 
20. David Harris Willson, "Summoning and Dis-
solving Parliament: 1603-1615," American Historical 
Review 45 (1940): 292). 
21. Willson, James VI and I, p. 416. 
41 
be humored either. Yet despite this formula for disas-
22 
ter, both retained a remarkable composure for months. 
In this parliament, the most damaging problem 
to the crown was not the lack of policy coordination or 
displays of personal antipathy, but the position that 
23 
Coke and Lionel Cranfield, the Earl o:f Middlesex, took 
toward the investigation of monopolies. Both men rejected 
reconciliation with the crown and instead openly encour-
aged the Commons to probe for the highest levels of 
24 
governmental corruption. 
The problem of the monopolies was so acute that 
"the world dot.h ever groan under the burden o:f these 
perpetual patents, which are become so frequent that 
whereas, at the King's coming in, there were complaints 
of some eight or nine monopolies then in being, they are 
22. Willson, James VI and I, p. 416. 
23. By the opening of parliament in 1621, Sir 
Edward fully realized that James would never place him 
into the type of position that a man of his energy and 
motivation needed. Therefore he and others developed a 
whole field of antiquarian research which they used to 
buttress·· the·:.~concept of the balanced constitution, using 
--or abusing--the myth of Magna Carta as their corner-
stone. By the 1620's, Coke felt that he had failed to 
make the bench the guardian of the constitution, so he 
strove to elevate the parliament to this position. 
Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution: 
1529-1642. (London, 1972), P• 104. 
24. Robert Zaller, The Parliament of 1621: A 
Study in Constitutional Conflict (Berkeley, 1971), 
p. 51. Hereinafter cited as: Zaller, Parliament of 1621. 
42 
25 
now said to be multiplied by so many scores." James, 
as had Elizabeth before him, saw the granting of these 
monopolies as a revenue source to the crovm, .but Coke 
felt that the "monopolizer engrosseth to himself what 
should be free for all men. The despulator nencloser 
of landJ turns all out of doors and keeps none but a 
26 
shephard and his dog." 
Coke championed this position so forcefully that 
James called him Captain Coke, the leader of the faction 
of the parliament. He not only quarreled with James, but 
also clashed fiercely with his colleagues when they got 
27 . 
in his way. . But both Coke and his fellow members felt 
that they had an excellent opportunity to push their 
demands. James's administration could no longer control 
the public's ear.· The public was well informed of the 
events in parliament because "speeches were printed and 
sold on the streets--pirated, ascribed to wrong names, 
often filled with error yet plainly revelatory of what" 
25. McClure,"Letter of Chamberlain to Dudley 
Carleton, July 8, 1620," Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 
2' p. 310. 
26. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, p. 420. 
27. Thomas Birch,"Letter of Mead to Stuteville, 
Feb. 2 1622," The Court and Times of James the Firs,!, 
vol. 2: (London, 1849), p. 289. McClure, "Letter of 
Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Carleton, Feb. }O, 1621," 
Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 2, P• J42. r11cClure, 
"Letter of Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, May 2, 1621," 
Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 2, P• 370. Wal~ace Notestein 
et al. eds. Common's Debates:1621, vol. 2, u;ew haven, 
1935. p. J62. Hereinafter cited as: f'-iotestein, Com-:non's 
Debates. 
4J 
28 
members of parliament were saying, doing, and voting. 
The king's problem did not cease here. The Commons 
wanted to examine not only the monopolies but with them 
the referees, whom James ha<f. appointed to examine the 
grants to assure that they were legal and fairly ad-
ministered. If Francis Bacon and Eord Treasurer 
Mandeville, the principal referees, were successfully 
29 
prosecuted, impeachment would be revived. 
Through the monopolies and their referees, Coke 
was mounting a personal attack on Bacon. Both he and 
Cranfield joined hands to bring Bacon under intense 
JO 
investigative .Pressure. And both, moved with zeal, 
knowing that if successful they would procure both 
Jl 
Bacon's removal from office and his public disgrace. 
The patent of the inns was the first to be 
examined. After showing that the monopoly had been drawn 
up by Bacon, Justice Finch and Solicitor Coventry, Coke 
found James blame-less concerning the issuance of the 
Having removed James from personal blame, the 
32 
patent. 
JJ 
patent of the inns was the first to be condemned in 1621. 
28. .Bowen, Lion and the Throne, p. 419. 
29. Willson, James VI and I, p. 418. 
JO. Gardiner, History of Eneland, vol. 4, p. 
40. 
Jl. Zaller, Parliament of 1621, p. 55. 
J2. ~~otestein, Commor:.'s .iJebates, vol. 4, p. 
253. 
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Soon afterward, the patent of the alehouses 
was found to be a "base thing" and therefore "we 
branded the very institution of it" like the patent 
34 /~ 
of the inns. The Commons, led by Coke, had passed 
condemnation against not only the monopolies but their 
35 
authors: the referees. The road now lay clear and 
open to the revival of impeachment which had been 
dormant for one hundred and fifty years. 
It was.because of Bacon's desire to crush the 
opposition to the gold and silver thread patent, which 
he firmly believed had been established to benefit the 
. 
commonwealth, that he alienated the Commons. As the par-
liament dragged on, the mutual animosity nurtured old 
wounds. Few of the members were shocked when Christopher 
Aubrey, a former client of Bacon's charged Bacon with 
36 
accepting a hundred pound bribe in 1618 from Aubrey's 
33. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 108-111; vol. 5, p. 
478-481; vol. 6, P• 251+-257. 
34. Ibid. , vol. 2, p. 118. 
35. Zaller, Parliament of 1621, p. 57. 
36. Bribery, as defined by Blackstone, is when 
a judge or other person concerned in the ad~inistration 
·of justice, takes an undue reward to influence his 
behavior in office. But in judges, especially the 
superior ones, Blackstone, cautions, it has always been 
looked upon as so heinous an offense that the Chief 
Justice Thrope was hanged for bribery in the reign of 
Edward III. Also by statute of Henry IV, all judges 
of offices of the king, convicted of bribery, shall 
• . b b • l d -1- -1-h 1' • ' forfeit triple the or1 e, e pun1s1e. a~ ~ e ~ing s 
will, and be discharged fro~ the king's service forever. 
45 
counsel, Sir George Hastings. For his money, Aubrey 
expected a "favorable decision upon his case," but when 
Bacon finally announced his decision in November of 1620, 
Aubrey was disappointed. He. was determined to appeal to 
37 
the House of Commons. 
As if Aubrey's charge was not enough to damage 
Bacon, Edward Egerton, another disappointed complainant, 
charged that he sent Sir Francis four hundred pounds 
which was "a thankful remembrance from a client" but 
"that the money was intended as a bribe is impossible 
to doubt." Egerton brought his charges before the Com-
mons only after his discovered, as did Aubrey, that his 
38 
money had not influenced a favorable verdict. 
Both men, therefore, chose the Commons to settle 
their dispute with Bacon. The charges were brought be-
fore a Committee of the Whole House. Coke assured 
.the Commons that there.was legal groundwork to under-
take such a case in parliament. On February 28, 
Coke asserted that the "complaints and examinations have 
39 
been ancient in the House of Commons." Again on March 6, 
Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. 4, (1786), P• 139. 
37. Gardiner, Historv of England, vol. 4, p. 
58-60. 
38. The decisions in both the Aubrey and Eger-
ton cases, most historians a~ee, were judicially cor-
rect. Ibid., vol. 4, P• 61- 4. 
39. Notestein, Common's Debates, vol. 4, o. 
53 Z 11 ~eAs these medieval precedents as being out 2 • a er - - 6 
f t ~ Zaller, Parliament of 1621, p. 9. Also, o co-:-1 ext.. 
46 
he justified h.is position before the House with 
40 
precedents. On rearch 8, the former Chief Justice sum-
med up his position by noting the different areas of 
jurisdiction: 
The Lords judge alone where the king is 
party and interested, as upon writs of 
Error, upon judgements in Banco Regis etc. 
And the commons judge alone upon offenses 
done during the Parliament or touching the 
House or anie member of it, etc. The Lords 
judge of common grievance at th~ complaint 
and praiers of .the commons etc. 1 
Coke further strengthened his argument by sug-
gesting that ·the parliament had not only the power but 
42 
the duty to impeach. He warned the Commons to "ques-
tion not the King's prerogatives; yet there is a 43erog-
ative which is disputable and may be questioned." 
Blackstone states that a "peer may be impeached for any 
crime," implying that this parliamentary trial was a legal 
method of punishment and without the need of the 
extensive justifJ.cation given by Coke. Blackstone, 
Commentaries, vol. 4, (1786), p. 257. 
40. Notestein, Common's Debates, vol. 5, p. 274 •. 
41 . .Notestein, Common's Debates, vol. 5, p. 32. 
The court of ·parliament is "the most high and supreme 
court of criminal jurisdiction in the most solemn grand 
inquest cimpeachmentJ of the whole kingdom." Blackstone, 
Commentaries, vol. 4, (1786), p. 256. 
42. The word "impeachment'' was used only once in 
·the parliament of 1621. Notestein, Common' s Debates, 
vol. 2, p. J14. 1J.lhe power of impeachment first appeared 
in 1376. For a further study see: T.F.T. Plucknett, 
"The Origin :of Impeachment," Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, 4th Ser., 25: 47-71. T.F.T. Fluck-
nett "The Imneachment of 1J76," TraJ1sactions of the Raval Hist~rical Society, 5th Ser., 1: 15J-164. 
4J. ~otestein, Co88on's Debates, vol. 6, p. 
47 
Still some of the members were not convinced 
that a trial was the proper course because there was only 
one witness to each alleged offense. On March 17 Coke 
moved to allay these fears by reminding his colleagues 
that it was proven precedent that "though there were a 
single witness in several matters, yet agreeing on one 
and the same third person, it was held sufficient to 
44 
prove a work of darkness." With this evidence before 
them, the Committee decided that the charges should be 
examined and presented to the Lords for prosecu-
45 
.J... • i.ion. 
There .can be little doubt that the House of Co~-
mons was to some degree prejudiced against the Lord 
Chancellor because 01" his conduct concerning the pater.ts, 
but there seems to have been no overt desire to deal 
with him unjustly. Bacon's real danger lay with '.the 
House of Lords, who, with the Commons, were not without 
their prejudices in conducting a political trial. 
Furthernore, at the time of the impeachment trial, on~· 
46 
one member had received a legal education·~ 
At this point, James realized that if he allc\,-,,,\ 
parliament to proceed alone in this matter he would 
44. Notestein, Common' s Debates, vol. 2, ~-P· 
242 1 vol. 4, p. 168. Journals of the House ~of ~om~~-·~l~~i 1547-1714, vol. 1, (London, 180J), p. 561. Hereina. • _. · 
cited as: Common's Journal. 
45. 
46. 
• I" 's D0 b~tes v~o1 l• ,, 1 ·'· • f';oteste1n, vommon ! ~ a. , • i-, ~. • • 
48 
forfeit all future power in such cases because cf the 
precedent which Bacon's impeachment would establish. 
On fi·:arch 19, James proposed that he empower a special 
commission, consisting of twelve members of the 
I 
Lower House and six of the Upper, to examine the pro-
47 
ceedings. At first Coke seemed to approve of the king's 
48 
plan and suggested that the members of parliament "should 
take heed the commission did not hinder the manner of our 
49 
parliamentary proceedings," He then recommended that 
a joint conference be held between the Commons and Lords 
50 
."before we give answer to this gracious message." 
But after further examination, Coke rejected the plan 
. 
outright. He charged that the plan forced parliament to 
draw temporary power from the king and that the commission 
could merely investigate the case, because the king 
51 
would reserve the right of final judgment to himself. 
With Edward presenting so strong an opposition, support 
52 
for the king's plan collapsed. 
Upon hearing that James's plan had been rejected, 
the Lord Chancellor wrote a letter to the Lords request-
47. Zaller, Parliament of 1621, p. 82. 
48. Common's Journal, vol. 1, P• 563. 
49. Notestein, Cmnmon' s Debates, vol. 2, P• 245. 
50. Ibid., vol. 4, P• 170; vol. 5, p. 50-51. 
51. Zaller, Parliament of 1621, p. 82. 
~2 r; 01 .... T'1oi1' s Journal, vol. 1, P• 56J. l\otestein, 
c o:nmon' s -· D~ bate~·~· ;ol. 2, p. 244-zL;. 5; vol. 4, p. 1 70. 
49 
ing that they give him time to make a defense and allow 
him to cross-examine and call witnesses. But he hast~n-
ed to add that he did not intend "to make greatness a 
53 
subterfuge for guiltiness." 
On March 21, Lady Wharton, a third disappoint-
ed plaintiff, filed a petition with the House of Commons, 
charging Bacon with accepting a three-hundred-pound 
54 
bribe. In both the Aubrey and Egerton cases it was 
not impossible that Bacon could have been deceived about 
the purpose of the bribe. But in the Wharton case, the 
bribe was so open that oacon could not have failed to 
lmow that Wharton expected to buy a favorable verdict. 
The fact tha~ the money was actually taken from a suitor 
before judgment was announced remained unaffected by any 
explanations, and was later admitted to be true by Bacon. 
Coke was delighted at the turn of events and declared 
that "'a corrupt judge is the grievance of grievances.'" 
In Bacon's defense it must be said that the 
53. Mary Anne Everett Green ed., Calender of 
State Fa ers Domestic of the Rei of James I, vol. 10, 
London, 1858-1859 , p. 2J • Hereinafter cited as: 
Green, St.P. Domestic. 
54. For details see Gardiner, History of 
England, vol. 4, p. 72-78. 
55. McClure, "Letter of Chamberlain to Sir 
Dudley Carleton, March 24, 1621," Letters of Chamber-
lain, vol. 2, p. 356. Gardiner, History of England, 
vol. 4, p. 78. Coke felt that the money taken from 
Aubrey, Egerton, and Wharton wa~ for a reward for 
pervert service. Therefore he 1elt Bacon had to be 
punished. Dr. Birch ed., Th~ ;voi;ks of Francis .3acon, 
vol. 6, (London, 1824), p. 2v2-28J. Hereinafter cited 
as: Birch, Works of Bacon. 
55 
50 
final decisions in the Aubrey, Egerton, and Wharton cases 
were a mere formality. The real decision on each case 
had been given long before the bribe was given. All that 
56 
Bacon intended to do was to'1reaffirm earlier decisions. 
His reason for taking the money seems to be the great 
expense of his love of pomp and ceremony. He supplement-
ed the compensation of his offices by receiving gifts or 
57 
bribes from litigants. It is estimated that the to.tal 
amount that Bacon received from these so-called presents 
58 
amounted to not less than one-hundred-thousand pounds. 
James was deeply disturbed about the whole 
issue of the Bacon investigation. He remarked to the 
Venetian Ambassador that "'if I were to imitate the 
conduct of your republic and begin to punish those who 
took bribes, I should soon not have a single subject 
59 
left.'" But by March 23, there seemed to be little 
the king could do. .The Lord Chancellor was suspended 
from his duties.and many felt that he would not be able 
56. Gardiner, Historv of England, vol. 4, p. 
80. 
57. Even though Bacon felt that some forms 
of bribery were wrong, he felt that the type he 
engaged in was not illegal because "the cause was 
really ended, and it is sine fraud~, without relations 
to any precedent promise." Birch, Works of .Bacon, 
vol. 6, p. 282-283. . 
58. Charles N. Bur~h, :'Th; Riva~s," Virginia 
Law Review 14 (1928):51J. Here1na~ter cited as: Burch, 
"The Rivals." 
59. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, p. 428. 
60 
to vindicate himself. 
51 
Two days later, on March 25, Bacon wrote James 
pledging that he would not try to "'triclc my innocency ••• 
by cavillations or voidances," but that he would confess 
to his misgivings and pray "God to give me the grace to 
61 
see to the bottom of my Faults.'" This may have been 
his intent to the king, but the members of parliament felt 
that he was using delaying tactics in the proceedings in 
the hope of "winning time, till the heat of prosecution 
62 
may be part over, or the parliament ended." 
But the accused Lord Chancellor was not the only 
one trying the patience of the parliament. Sir Edward 
was accused by some of his colleagues of being "care-
less in his opinions" and setting forth precedents that 
were either misapplied or perverted to "a wrong sence." 
Although some sure~y felt this was an attempt by Coke 
to ensure to prosecution of his enemy, most simply 
63 
attributed his lack of acumen to the ravages of age. 
60. Green, St.P. Domestic, vol. 10, p. 237. 
61. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 4, p. 82. 
62. Bacon probably hoped James would dismiss 
parliament and thereby end the prosecution. McClure, 
"Letter of Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Carleton, March 28, 
1621, 11 Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 2, P• 359. 
63. Green, St. P. Domestic, vol. 10, p. 240. 
McClure,"Letter of Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, March 
28, 1621," Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 2, p. 358. A 
flaw in Coke's character was his mistaking his personal 
battles with James or Bacon with titanic conflicts of 
principle. G.R. Elton, Studies in Tudor and Stuart !>~. 
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On March JO, the king, in a move clearly designed 
to utilize the factions within parliament and to allay 
the resentment against Bacon in the popular ~arty, issued 
a p~oclamation repealing the alehouse patent and the 
64 
patent for concealed lands. But this move had almost 
65 
no effect on the members, because as Pym exp~ained it, 
"the power of judgement in parliament, which the great 
while hath slept, hath been awakened to the terror of 
66 
such offenders," 
In mid-April a joint committee was formed in the 
House of Lords to examine all the charges against Bacon. 
With the evidence and sentiment mounting against him, 
Bacon's hope grew faint and on April 20 he told the king 
that he would confess all that he could not excuse. But 
when handed a copy of the charges against him, he knew 
67 
that any further defense would be futile. 
The Lord .. Chahcellor then appealed to James and 
the Lords to accept his general submission to the charges 
and suggested that the loss of the seal would be suffi-
Politics and Government: Pa ers and Reviews: 1 46-1 2, 
vol. 2, {Cambridge, 1974 , p. 165. Hereinafter cited asi 
Elton, Studies in Politics. 
64. Green, St.P. Domestic, vol. 10,.p. 240. 
65. McClure, "Letter of Chamberlain to Dudley 
Carleton, April 7, 1621," Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 
2, P• J60. 
66. Notestein, Common's Debates, vol. 5, p. 185. 
67. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 4, p. 
90-91. 
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cient punishment for his wrongs. James took steps 
in an attempt to aid his fallen Chancellor. On Friday, 
April 2J, he met both Houses and chided them not "to 
69 
scandalize great persons without pregnant proof." 
The House was not in such a conciliatory mood and 
demanded a full confession to every point. Bacon handed 
70 
to the House the required confession on April JO. 
In his confession, he made no attempt to blind the eyes 
of the judges, but at the same time he neither admitted 
that his intentions were corrupt nor that his actions 
71 
had been innocent. 
On May 2, the great seal was taken from Bacon and 
as punishment for his crimes he was censured from parlia-
' 
ment-, ordered to pay forty. thousand pounds to the king, 
banished from court and told not to come within twenty 
miles thereof, and to be imprisoned at James's pleas-
72 
ure. 
68. Green, St.P. Domestic, vol. 10, p. 249. 
69. McClure, "Letter of Chamberlain to Dudley 
Carleton, April 2;, 1621," Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 
2, p. 366. 
70. See Cobbett for a full text of the Bacon 
confession. William Cobbett, The Parliamentary History 
of En land from Earliest Times to the Year 180 , vol. 1, 
London, 1806 • p. 1244. Hereinafter cited as: Cobbett, 
Parliamentary History. 
71. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 4, p. 99. 
72. McClure, "Letter of Chamberlain to Dudley 
Carleton, May 2, 1621," Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 2, 
p. 370. Walter Yonge, Diary of Walter Yonge, Esq.: 1604-
1628, ed. George Roberts, (London, 1848), p. J6. 
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The following day, Sir Edward, in a speech to 
parliament, suggested that "we dare not to gaine any new 
Judicature and therefore we say so; and for the other 
part, we desire that he cJamesl will ratify that we 
73 
have donn; it will be his act as well as ours." It 
was a credit to Coke that, notwithstanding his feelings 
and his vindictiveness toward Bacon, he deported him-
self on this occasion without any show of arrogance 
over the ruin of his rival. Lord Macaulay, who regarded 
Coke as one of the meanest and most narrow-minded men, 
said that "Sir Edward,Coke, for the first time in his 
74 
life, behaved like a gentleman." 
In early June, James dissolved parliament with 
75 
the statement that he would never call another. But 
after adjournment he. "swept away eighteen monopolies and 
listed another seventeen to be examined by the courts." 
This "was a victory in fact but not in essences parlia-
ment had desired to cancel these grants through 
76 
legislation, not by 'the King's Grace.'" 
Coke's victory did not last long because soon 
after parliament adjourned, Bacon was granted a pardon 
77 
by James under "the power of the Privy Seal." James 
73. Notestein, Common's Debates, vol. 2, p. J42. 
74. Burch, "The Rivals," p. 522. 
75. Willson, "Summoning ••• Parliament," P• 297. 
76. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, P• 445. 
77. Birch, Works of Bacon, vol. 6, p. 292. 
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was again ready to pluck the thorn from his side: Sir 
Edward Coke, whom he described as the "fittest instru-
78 
ment for a tyrant that ever was in England." There 
was a bill registered in the Star Chamber against the 
79 
former Chief Justice, and orders were issued to seal 
up the door of Coke's London home and to seize all his 
80 
papers. He was taken to the Tower where he remained 
for seven months, or "twenty-six weeks and five days" 
as he put it. In August of 1622, Sir Edward was per-
mitted to go home but confined to six miles from Stoke. 
During that period the king had his papers closely exam-
ined. When nothing could be found that displayed dis-
loyali ty to the crown, James was forced to release him. 
"'Throw this man where you will,'"fumed James, "'and he 
81 
falls upon his legs.'" 
In essence, .the parliament successfully revived 
the dormant power of impeachment and in doing so forced 
82 
the government to change its approach to grievances. 
In other words, the Commons were claiming that there 
was no aspect of policy too high for them to deal with. 
It almost amounted to the total claim of the modern 
78. Zaller, Parliament of 1621, p. 188. 
79. Roberts, Diary of Yonge, p. 51. 
80. Cobbett, Parliamentary History, vol. 1, p. 
1371. 
81. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, p. 455-457. 
82. David Willson, The Priyy Councillors in the 
House of Commons: 1604-1622 (New York, 1971), p. ~5. 
House of Commons to have the executive pursing policies 
83 
with broad lines approved by parliament. 
James's promise to never call another parlia-
ment was short lived. In the fall of 1623, Charles and 
Buckingham returned from Madrid and demanded a reversal 
of English policy which would advocate war against Spain. 
They proposed the calling of a parliament which would 
have the purpose of dissolving the marriage treaties with 
,, a minimum of royal embarrasment. The parliament would 
also be expected to supply the funds for the war material. 
According to the Venetian ambassador, James reluctantly 
capitulated only when it was agreed that Coke and Sandys 
84 
would be excluded from the Commons. Therefore, when on 
. 
December 20, 1623, the Council voted for a parliament, 
James consented only after the two prospective leaders, 
Coke and Sandys, w~re appointed to a commission that was 
to leave for Ireland on January 12, 1624. Almost im-
mediately pressure began to mount for James to change his 
mind. Princ.e Charles implored his father to allow the 
aging Coke to remain in London ".in respect of his years 
85 
being threescore and fourteen." By the end of the month, 
James had rescinded his order and postpone.d the trip 
8J. Ronald Butt, The Power of Parliament, (New 
York, 1967), p~ 43. 
84. Willson, "Summoning ••• Parliament," p. 298. 
85. McClure,"Letter of Chamberlain to Dudley 
Carleton, Jan. Jl, 1624," Letters of Chamberlain, vol. 
2, P• 536, 
86 
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until late spring. With this action the parliament of 
1624 opened with both men in their seats. 
James appeared before the parliament asking its 
advice as to how the Spanish treaties could be handled so 
as to advance religion and the common good and to restore 
87 
the Palatinate to his daughter Elizabeth and her husband 
Frederick. With the door ajar, the Lords and Commons 
took the initiative and at once debated the Spanish 
treaties. They sent the king a petition begging that the 
treaties be ended and promising assistance if war broke 
88 
out with Spain. James was angered that parliament would 
dare suggest war with Spain, which he considered beyond 
their comprehension and sent them sharp rejoinders. But 
Charles and Buckingham boldly interceded and explained 
away the king's words which had the effect of entirely 
89 
altering their meani~g. 
~-
. When the time came for parliament ~o grant the 
assistance they had promised, James asked them to 
86. Ibid., "Letter of Chamberlain to Sir 
Dudley Carleton, Jan. Jl, 1624," vol. 2, p. 543. 
87. The Palatinate was near Frankfurt and Worms, 
and is now part of West Germany. 
88. The general attitude in England was that 
war with Spain was a good thing in itself, needing no 
further justification. England argued Coke, never pros-
pered so well as when she was at war with the Spanish. 
Coke felt that if war proved successful, England need 
.not "care for Pope, Turk, Spain nor all the devils in 
hell." In essence, l11any English felt that a Spanish 
war would provide the economic stimulis for a boom at 
home. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 5, p. 194. 
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provide for a vast continental alliance that would re-
quire no less than nine hundred thousand pounds, an 
amount which was utterly unprecedented in the reign of 
James. By March 20, the parliament agreed to provide 
90 
only three hundred thousand pounds. 
Having successfully forced James to renege on his 
personal vow not to alienate Spain, Coke and his col-
leagues turned toward new prey. Lord Treasurer Cranfield 
was soon charged with bribery and of being personally res-
ponsible for the dissolution of the parliament of 1621. 
On April 7 Coke stated that "the affirmative in accusa-
tions is ever presumed, til the negative is proved." 
Upon hearing about Sir Edward's new impeachment effort, 
Sir Edward Conway, the Earl of Essex, wrote that "if once 
in seven years he were not to help ruin a great man 
91 
he slDULd die himself." But the aging jurist was 
not alone in his zeal to discredit Cranfield. John 
Chamberlain reported that "there has been no man in Eng-
land these two hundred years whose ruin has been so 
92 
thirsted after.by all sorts of people." The mood of 
Chamberlain also seems to have been the moo.d of the ma-
jority of the Commons. This sentiment seems to have been 
shared by William Noy, who as early as April .5 had leaned 
90. Gardiner, History of England, vol • .5, p. 200. 
91. Robert E. Ruigh, The Parliament of 1624: 
Politics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 1971), p. J19. 
92, Green, St.P. Domestic, vol. 11, p. 214. 
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toward discounting the charges against Cranfield as mat-
ters of small importance. But in less than one week's 
time, he had re-examined the evidence and became con-
93 
vinced that the Lord Treasurer was guilty as charged. 
By April 15, all the charges had been laid out by 
Coke and Sandys against Cranfield. They demanded no less 
94 
than his removal from office by impeachment. The same 
day James addressed a letter to the Speaker of the House 
of Commons specifically absolving the Treasurer of all 
blame in connection with the dissolution of the parlia-
ment of 1621 by stating that the Lord Treasurer "was upon 
his knees before us humble, desiring us to continue it 
9.5 
cthe parliamentJ." 
Once again royal intervention proved to be of 
little value, and on April 18, Coke took up the charge of 
96 
bribery and the "high court of the realm" decided to 
treat Cranfield as they had .earlier dealt with Bacon--
meaning conviction as charged which carried the penalty 
of loss of office, imprisonment in the Tower, and heavy 
97 
fines •. 
In reference to Buckingham's and Charles's 
"re-definition" of James's words at the beginning of 
93. Ruigh,Parliament of 1624,p.332. 
94. Gardiner,History of England,vol.6,p.230. 
95. Ruigh,Parlia~ent of 1624,p.333. 
96. Green,St.P. Domestic,vol.11,p.217. 
97. Bowen,Lion and the Throne,p.462. 
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the session, James turned to Buckingham and blurted: 
"'You are a fool; You are making a rod cof impeachmentl 
with which you will be scourged yourself,'" Then turn-
ing to his son, he remarked:"'You will live to have your 
98 
bellyfull of impeachment.'" 
With the exception of the Statute of Monop-
olies, little else was accomplished in the parliament 
of 1624, and it was soon adjourned. Within a year after 
the parliament ended, James was dead and England passed 
rapidly from the England under James, who felt a hostil-
ity toward parliament he was afraid to antagonize, to 
the England under Charles I, who endeavored to overrule 
99 
the parliaments which he hated. 
98. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 5, p. 
231. 
99. James Oscar Pierce, "Constitutional Phases 
of English History i'.n the. Seventeenth Century," 
American Law Review 7 J7s26. 
EDWARD'S LAST PARLIAMENT1 1628 
As was customary, a new parliament was called 
in 1625 to open the new reign. Little was accomplished 
because of Coke's stern opposition to granting huge new 
subsidies. This parliament was short-lived because the 
plague swept through London. Thus the next year, Charles 
called another parliament, and to prevent opposition, the 
king appointed his antagonists, including Coke, as 
sheriffs so they could not sit. Also, Charles ordered 
the collection of a forced loan to bolster his sagging 
treasury. Those who refused to contribute were commit-
ted to prison where they remained until they granted the 
1 
king the funds he had requested. Finally five of the 
prisoners, collectively known as the Five Knights, decid-
ed to appeal to the Court of King's Bench for a writ of 
habeas corpus in order to know their ·offense. The case 
was heard on November 22, 1627. The defense argued that 
the cause of committal must be expressed. Along wfth 
this position, the Five Knights quoted from the Magna 
Carta which states that "'no man should be imprisoned 
except by the legal judgement of his peers, or by the 
laws of the land.,'" which the Knights claimed meant . 
2 
"'due process of law.'" They also entered a long line 
of precedents where the persons committed by the Privy 
Council had been brought before the King's Bench for 
1. E.R. Adair, "The Petition of Right," History 
5 (1920)t99· 
2. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 6, p. 
62 
bail as a preparation for trial. But the royal attorney 
attempted to show that in all such cases the king had 
voluntarily handed over the defendants by "King's Grace" 
and not by any legal precedent. The royal lawyer then 
asked the judges to trust the king because he had good 
4 
reason to withold the case from their knowledge. 
On November 28, in their decision, the judges 
chose to take a middle of the road view. They refused 
to order a hearing on bail for the Knights, but they also 
refused to assert that the crown could "persistently 
refuse to show cause." It was clear that the bench 
did not contain the quality of leadership that Coke had 
provided in earlier years, and therefore the issue re-
mained in limbo until it could be debated in the forth-
.5 
coming parliament. 
214. For a study of ·the application of Magna Carta in the 
seventeenth century see: Maurice Ashley, Magna Carta in 
the Seventeenth Century, Magna Carta Essays, (Charlot-
tesville, 1966). 
J. Gardiner, History of England, vol, 6, p. 21.5. 
4. Ibid., P• 216. 
5. The Five Knights were no doubt appealing to 
the edition of 1215 and not to any of the later editions. 
For a complete legalistic approach to the Five Knight's 
case and to the writ of Habeas Corpus sees Frances Helen 
Relf, The Petition of Right (Minneapolis, 1917), p. 1-
10, Hereinafter cited as: Relf, Petition of Right. 
Edward Jenks, "The Story of Habeas Corpus," Law guarterly 
Review 18164-77. C.C. Crawford, "The Writ of Habeas 
Corpus," American Law Review 421488-502. Daniel John 
Meador, Habeas Corpus and IV!agna Carta, Magna Carta 
Essays, (Charlottesville, 1966). The University of 
Virginia Press has also published an entire series called 
Magna Carta Essays that the student might find useful. 
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As the day of the opening of the parliament of 
1628 drew near, the leaders began to see that the strug-
gle would have to go beyond the ministers to the king 
6 
himself. The fundamental right of property was at stake 
and this great abuse of the prerogative aroused a strong 
feeling of resentment and opposition in the lawyers, and 
the question of the use of the writ of habeas corpus gave 
them the legal means to combat the abuse. This desire to 
curb the king's prerogative was the direct result of the 
7 
imprisonment for refusing to contribute to the loan. A 
few days before the opening session of the parliament, a 
caucus met, including Edward Coke, Robert Phelips, Thomas 
Wentworth, and John Selden, and agreed that they would 
go directly to the point of the king's invasion of the 
8 
rights of his subject. 
Sir Edward insisted that the common law recog-
nized no power of the king's to punish. "Whatever the 
king's power was by common law," he explained, "yet it 
was qualified by acts of parliament, and no man will deny 
but the king may limit himself by acts of parliament."· 
In another meeting Coke asserted that the king "hath 
9 
distributed his judicial power to the Courts of Justice." 
The lawyers, therefore, attempted to show that Charles's 
6. Gough, Fundamental Law, P• 61. 
7. Relf, Petition of Right, p. 20. 
8. Lyon, Oracle of the Law, P• 315. 
9. Relf, Petition of Right, P• 22. 
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policy was by all measure against the best interests 
of the kingdom. The first argument set forth by the 
10 
lawyers approached the subject from the negative side. 
The legalists tried to demonstrate that there was no power 
to imprison in the king because the existing law did not 
recognize it. To "extend an imprisonment without rea-
11 
son," said Coke, "is against reason." To the old 
jurist, the lack of regulation was conclusive proof that 
the power was not recognized by the law. The second ar-
gument against arbitrary imprisonment followed the rea-
soning that according to the common law, imprisonment 
without cause made subjects less than freemen. Coke back-
ed their argument by citing two cases that he felt demon-
strated that a criminal could not be imprisoned by his 
lord without cause being shown. No freeman, so the lawyers 
claimed, could be imprisoned for any offense unless the 
12 
charge was explicitly provided for by statute. And it 
was through the effort of the Commons to settle the issue 
of arbitrary imprisonment that led them to develop the 
Petition of Right. 
The first sign of visible protest came on March 
20, when Coke and Phelips advocated that the Commons join 
them and participate in a fast, because as Sir Edward 
put it, "there are, I fear, some devils that will not be 
10. Ibid.,p.22, 
11. Ibid. ,p. 23. 
12. Ibid.,p.22-23. 
cast out by fasting and prayer." The next day, 
Coke presented a bill that included provisions that guar-
anteed that no man for any cause of crime be held 
in prison more than three months without trial or re-
lease; and that he should be given the opportunity to 
answer the charges within two months, and if he were not 
given bail by the third month, he would be released on 
lJ 
habeas corpus as a matter of course. The Commons hotly 
debated this bill. Little progress was made until the 
opinion of former Chief Justice Anderson was read to the 
members which swayed many of the listeners. In his opin-
ion, Anderson favored the leaders of the Commons rather 
14 
than the lawyers for the crown. Coke summed up the 
issue when he stated that the question was "'whether a 
freeman can be imprisoned by the King without setting 
1.5 
down a cause.'" With the opinion, the Commons on 
c-
Apr il 1, voted a resolution which held the position 
that no freeman could be committed without cause shown 
and that everyone committed had a right to habeas 
corpus, which meant immediate release if no justification 
16 
for imprisonment couid be given. 
On April 7, Coke, Dudley Digges, Selden, and 
Thomas Littleton met with the Lords with the con-
13. Lyon, Oracle of the Law, p. 316. 
14. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 6, p. 245. 
16. Lyon, Oracle of the Law, p. 317. 
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clusions of the Lower House. After explaining at length 
the platform of the Commons, Coke closed by quoting the 
Roman Agrippa who felt that "it was unreasonable, in 
I 
sending a prisoner cto prisonJ, not to indicate the 
17 
charges against him. 0 '11 he House of Lords took the Com-
mon' s resolution under advisement. On Good Friday, April 
10, Charles, in dire need of new subsidies from parlia-
ment, ordered the members not to take the traditional 
18 
Easter recess. 
The debate in the Lord's became so intense that 
19 
Joseph Mead described the tone as "like tongue-combat 
was never heard in the upper house." Out of this strug-
gle in the Lords came a counter-proposal to the Commons, 
The resolution passed by the Lords was .in five parts. 
The first four were general and vague, whereas those from 
the Commons had been direct and to the point; but the 
fifth was of quite a'different nature. It declared that 
the king's prerogative was "instrinsical to his sover-
eignty and entrusted him from God," and then it declared 
that when, for reasons of state, it was necessary to im-
prison without showing cause, the king could "within a 
convenient time ••• express a cause ••• either general or 
17. Acts of the Apostles, 25i27. 
18. Lyon, Oracle of the Law,p.J18. 
19. Mead was a biblical scholar who is most 
remembered for Clavis Apocalyptica. Leslie Stephen and 
Sidney Lee eds. ,Dictionary of National Biography,vol. 
23, (London,1921),p.178. 
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20 
special." 
Coke denounced the Lord's proposal with ridi-
cule. "Our resolutions," he snorted, "are plain and open 
21 
and clear, what theirs are to dispute." Selden echoed 
his objectionss"Our own are all clear points of law, 
their answer is not what is law, but they would have 
to be law." With great apprehension, Coke went on to 
declare that "'Reason of State lames Magna Carta!'" and 
Selden wondered out loud if "'at this little gap,'" refer-
ring to the words 'convenient time,' "'every man's 
22 
liberty in time go out. '" 
On April 28, Charles summoned the Commons before 
him in the Upper House. The situation was becoming crit-
ical. Nearly every available penny of funds had been 
diverted to the war effort, but since the fall the ar-
mies on the continent had been left to shift for them-
selves. The German campaign had turned into disaster and 
the same fate loomed against the armies in France. There 
was little doubt in the parliament about what the message 
would be. Charles explained that everyday the need for 
additional funds increased. He went on to blame 
the cause of the delay on the debate on liberty which 
the king felt had dragged on much too long. In order to 
expedite the proceedings, Charles declared that he held 
20. Relf, Petition of Right, P• 28. 
211 Ibid. , p. 28. 
22. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 6, p. 262. 
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Magna Carta and the six statutes to be in force and would 
"'maintain all his subjects in the just freedom of their 
persons and safety of their esta~es, according to the laws 
and statutes of the realm.'" For this the Commons were 
2J 
asked to rely upon Charles's good word. 
Sir John Coke, a member of the Privy Council, 
rose to urge the Commons to accept the king at his word. 
He readily argued that the Commons would get as much by 
promise as by law because "whatsoever law we shall make, 
it must come to his Majesty's allowance." John Coke went 
on to point out the advantage of the promise over law: 
"His promise is bound by his own heart," and he reminded 
his fellows that against a law a king could use his 
dispersing and pardoning power, thereby making their ef-
forts mute. He lectured that "all law with the wrath of 
a king is nothing." Yet the pleas of King Charles and 
John Coke were met by deaf ears and the Commons pushed 
24 
forward with their bill. 
On May 1, 1628, Charles interrupted the debate 
demanding to know if the Lower House would abide by 
his promise. A series of messages passed back and forth 
between the Commons and Crown with the result that 
the king prohibited any bill that would be more than 
a bare confirmation and not new law. The right of a bare 
2J. Gardiner, History of England, vol, 6, p. 263. 
24. Relf, Petition of Right, p. 28-29. 
25. Ibid., p. J4. 
confirmation meant nothing. As far as the bill was 
concerned, the members knew that "'to speak in a plain 
26 
language, we are now come to the end of our journey.'" 
The Commons had to stand their ground. In spite of the 
warning from Charles that he would allow but a bare 
confirmation, on May 5, the Commons answered the king 
with a remonstrance that charged Charles's ministers 
with having violated the laws of the realm. Before the 
paper was sent, they softened their position by adding 
the statement that they had no wish to encroach on his 
27 
sovereignty or prerogative. In response to the remon-
strance, the king held his ground and said nothing be-
cause to answer would be to admit guilt by association. 
Charles would only acknowledge that he would repeat the 
earlier promise he had made. During the debates over 
what answer, if any, Charles should give, the Royal 
Secretary put forth' the idea that a petition might be 
presented to Charles. With the remonstrance a dead let-
28 
ter, Edward Coke took hold of the idea of a petition: 
Did ever Parliament rely on messages? They 
ever put up petitions of their grievances, 
and the King ever answered them? The King's 
answer is very gracious. But what is the law 
of the realm? That is the question. I 
put no difference in his Majesty. The King 
must speak by a record and in particulars, and 
not in general. Let us have a conference 
with the Lords, and join in a Petition of 
26. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, p. 492. 
27. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 6, p. 270. 
2s.· Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 5, 
P• 452. 
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Right to the King for our particular grievances. 
Not that I distrust the King, but because we 
cann~~ take his trust but in a Parliamentary 
way. 
What the Commons had originally wanted was a bill 
to interpret the ancient laws from their particular point 
of view, so as to shut out forever the equally legitimate 
interpretation that the crown had put upon them. There-
fore they rejected Charles's idea of a mere confirmation 
of the laws, and seeing that there was no hope of passing 
their bill, dropped it and decided to proceed by a 
JO 
petition of right. And this petition of right was the 
first attempt to commit to the statute books what had been 
regarded as certain fundamental rights, which now would 
Jl 
bind the judges henceforth. 
Everything to which Charles had objected in the 
J2 
bill sprang forth again in the petition "in a harder and 
29. Gardiner~History of England,vol.6,p.274. 
30. Adair,"Petition of Right,p.100. In the 
change from bill to petition and in the subsequent action 
upon the petition is revealed the bitterness and what 
must have seemed as the almost complete hopelessness of 
the struggle. More than that, this struggle reveals that 
the end was not victory, but compromise, Relf ,Petition 
of Right,preface iii. 
Jl. Kenyon,Stuart Constitution,p.lOJ, The last 
petition of right to be presented before the nineteenth 
century was presented in 1614. Ludwik Ehrlick,"Petitions 
of Right,"Law Quarterly Review 45(1929):69. 
J2. Blackstone explained that " ••• if any person 
has, in point of property, a just demand upon the King, 
he must petition him in his court of chancery, where his 
chancellor will administer right as a matter of grace, 
though not upon compulsion;" Blackstone,Comrnentaries,vol. 
1,(1786),p.24J. Therefore the Commons ran the risk that 
Charles would refuse to assent to their petition. 
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more obnoxious form." His acceptance of the bill would 
have been a friendly agreement to order his relations 
with the nation on new terms. "His acceptance of the 
JJ 
petition would be a humble aclmowledgement of error." 
The petition, which was delivered to the Lords by Coke, 
had four main pointsi (l)"That no man hereafter be com-
pelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, 
or suchlike charge, without the common consent" ·_,through 
parliament; (2) that no freeman be detained in prison 
without cause shown; (J) that soldiers and marines should 
not be billited upon inhabitants against their wills, 
thus recognizing the ancient custom that "'no man is 
forced to take soldiers but inns, and thus to be paid by 
them;'" (4) that commissions for proceeding by martial 
law "'against soldiers and marines or other dissolute 
persons joining with them'" by revoked and no fresh com-
34 
missions be granted in time to come. 
On May 12, Charles appeared before parliament and 
fought hard to save his emergency power of imprisonment 
without showing cause. He argued that the petition, as 
presented,involved "'the very intermitting of that con-
stant rule of government practiced for so m~ny ages within 
this Kingdom," and warned that it would soon "dissolve the 
35 
foundation and frame of our monarchy.'" 
33. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 6, p. 275. 
J4, Tanner, Constitutional Conflicts, p. 62, 
35. Gardirier;.History of England, vol. 6, p. 276. 
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The Commons rejected the king's overture, but 
the Lords, who had invited Coke to sit in committee with 
them, tried to accommodate him with the insertion of this 
clauses 
We humbly present this Petition to your 
Majesty, not only with a case of preserving 
our liberties but with a due regard to 
leave entire that sovereign power where-
with your Majesty is entrusted for the 
protection, Sgfety, and happiness of 
your people.36 
Coke was shocked by the Lord's wording. "'I know 
that prerogative is part of the law, but 'sovereign power' 
is no parliamentary word. In my opinion it weakens Magna 
Carta and all our statutes, for they are absolute, with-
out any savings of 'sovereign power' •••• Magna Carta is such 
37 
a fellow that he will need no sovereign.'" Coke felt 
that this gave him reason to hold the members in line for 
the petition, because as a fellow member reminded the 
House, "the King .. declared that if we went by Act of Parlia-
ment, he would not assent." Coke further lectured his 
fellows that there were precedents to prove that "what-
soever the Lords house and this house have at anytime 
agreed upon no judge ever went against it; and the judges 
in former times doubted of the law they went to Parlia-
ment, and there resolutions were given to which they 
38 
were bound." 
36. Tanner, Constitutional Conflicts,p.62_63~ 
37. Ibid. ,p.63. 
38. Rel~, Petition of Right,p.43. 
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By May 25, members of the Lords who wished to 
accommodate Charles no further were able to command a 
majority. The next day the petition, as presented by the 
Commons, was read three times and then assented to--"per 
39 
omnes, nemine dissentient"--unaminously. By May 28, 
the petition had successfully passed both Houses and now 
awaited only the king's assent. 
The king's dire need for the subsidies placed him 
in a position where he was close to being forced to give 
his approval. By May 27, he had already lost three ships 
to pirates, and without the money the relief of La Rochel-
le and the hoped for cracking of the French fortifications 
40 
was an impossible dream. In spite of the urgency, 
Charles again held back. He feared the.loss of any of 
his power. Charles began to maneuver behind the scenes. 
He summoned the judges into his presence to seek their 
41 
legal council be~ore ·making any more decisions. 
The first question that the king directed toward 
J9. Gardiner,History of En~land,vol.6,p.288. 
Relf ,Petition of Right,p.47,note 2 • Harold Hulme,"Opin-
ion in the House of Commons of the Proposal for a Petition 
of Right, 6 May 1628," English Historical Review L (1935)1 
J06. 
40. Gardiner,History of England,vol.6,p.293. 
Ever since 1626, relations with France had been poor. 
Charles was at war with both Germany and France. But it 
was not until 1628, that the need for money to continue 
the war became critical. The crisis began in April of 
1628, when German Stade surrendered. It soon became ap-
parent in England that without immediate funds, the Eng-
lish would also be driven out of France. 
41. Ibid.,p.294. 
74 
the judges was "'whether in a case whatsoever the King 
may not commit a subject without showing cause.'" The 
answer came back that "'by general rule of the law the 
cause of commitment by his Majesty ought to be showna .Yet 
some cases may require such secrecy that the King may com-
mit a subject without showing cause, for a convenient 
42 
time.'" Still not satisfied, he then asked "'whether in 
a case of habeas corpus be brought, and a warrant from the 
King without a general or specific cause returned, the 
judges ought to deliver him before they understood the 
cause from the King.'" Upon this request, the judges 
replied1 
Upon an habeas corpus brou,ght for one com-
mi ted by the King, if the cause be not 
generally or specially returned, so that 
the Court may take knowledge thereof, the 
party ought, by general rule of law, be 
delivered. But if the case be such that 
requireth secrecy, and may not be presently 
disclosed, the ·court in discretion may for-
bear to deliver the prisoner for a conven-
ient time, to the end the Court ~~y be 
advertised the truth thereof •••• 
Feeling he needed further clarification, Charles 
44 
placed one final question before the bench. He wanted 
to know "whether, if he grant the Petition of Right, 
42. Ibid., P• 294. 
4J. W.J. Jones, Politics and the Bench (London, 
1971), P• 165, 
44. The answer was not exactly what Charles want-
ed. It meant that the judges might grant a remand at 
their discretion but that the length of the remand was 
not to depend upon the king's pleasure. Gardiner, 
History of England, vol. 6, p. 295. 
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he does not conclude himself from committing a subject 
without showing cause?" On May 31. the answer came back 
which stated that "although the petition be granted there 
is no fear of the conclusion as is intimated in the 
45 
question." 
But this indirect promise of compliance to the 
crown's view did not relieve Charles from apprehensions 
that he might lose the prerogative of arbitrary commit-
ment. Nevertheless, the king gave his answer to the peti-
tion on June 2, 1628. The Lord Keeper read the royal 
approval a 
The King willeth that right be done according 
to the laws and customs of the realm; and that 
the statutes be put in due execution, that his 
subjects may have no cause to complain of any 
wrongs or oppressions contrary to their just 
rights and liberties, to the preservation 
whereof he holds himself in co~gcience as well 
obliged as of his prerogative. 
Charles then spoke airectly to the membersa 
Gentlemen, I am come here to perform my duty. 
I think no man can think it long, since I 
have not taken so many days in answering.~: the 
petition as ye spent weeks in framing its and I 
am come hither to show you that, as well in 
formal things as essential, I desi4~ to give 
you as .much content as in my lies. I 
But the answer upon examination meant nothing at 
all. Coke counseled his fellow members that the judges 
45. John Bruce ed., Calender of State Papers 
Domestic Series of the Rei of Charles I, vol. J, 
London, 1859 , P• 1 2. Hereinafter cited asz Bruce, 
St. P. Domestic. 
(¥.6:. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 6, p. 297. 
47. Ibid., P• 297. 
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were bound by the petition if the king gave consent with 
the Norman "soit droit fait comme il est desire." With-
out these words the answer, in Coke's opinion, was mean-
48 
ingless. Charles did not even mention the petition 
nor did he agree to the Common's interpretation of the 
resolution. When the king's answer was later read before 
the Commons there was general dissatisfaction and the 
leaders became united in the determination that Charles's 
answer should omit any reference to the prerogative, for 
as Coke warned, "In a doubtful thing, Interpretation always 
49 
goes for the King." 
Charles was furious with this turn of events. He 
felt that he had done enough. But to complicate matters, 
another remonstrance, suggested by Sir ·Edward against the 
50 
Duke of Buckingham, was presented on the floor. On 
Thursday, June 4, Charles told the Commons that the session 
would end in a week and that he would give no other 
answer to their petition. The next day Charles sent a 
sharply worded message to the House of Lords forbidding 
51 
them to take up any new business. The king's attempt 
48, Bowen,Lion and the Throne,p.499, 
49. Margaret Atwood Judson,The Crisis of the 
Constitution (New York,1971),p.264, Hereinafter cited 
as : Judson,Crisis of the Constitution. 
50. The remonstrance was to charge the Duke of 
Buckingham with general governmental mismanagement. Bowen, 
Lion and the Throne,p.499, 
51. The message to the Lords arose because the 
Upper House chose to ignore the warning given by Charles 
to the Commons. The Lords had begun hearings on the 
77 
to prevent the remonstrance that had arisen earlier in 
the week was of no avail. In the Corrunons, Coke rose to 
remind his colleagues of what he saw as their respon-
sibility. He argued that they must continue with their 
remonstrance. The parliament of Edward III had attacked 
John of Gaunt. Likewise, parliament had attacked the 
crown under Henry III and Richard II. "'What shall we 
do,'" pleaded Coke. "'Let us palliate no longer! If we 
52 
do, God will not prosper us.'" The rest of the house 
was only too glad to follow Coke's lead, "'as when one 
good hound recovers the scent, the rest come in with a 
53 
full cry. ' " 
On June 7, the Lords asked the Commons to join 
them in requesting another answer to the petition from 
Charles. The Upper House feared that the Common's inves-
tigation of grievances under the auspices of their new 
remonstrance had gone far enough. The Commons reluc-
tantly agreed to the request and a deputation was sent to 
54 
ask for a clear and satisfactory answer to the petition. 
On June 8, Charles answered their request: 
remonstrance prepared by Eliot, who felt that the king 
should be made aware of the grievances and.trends of 
thought in the Commons. Gardiner, History of England, 
vol. 6, p. 301, 
52. Bowen, Lion and the Throne, P• 501. 
53. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 6, 
P• 305-306. 
54. Bruce, St.P. Domestic, vol. 3, p. 153. 
78 
The answer I have already given you was made 
with so good deliberation and approved by the 
judgement of so many wise men, that I could 
not have imagined but that it should have 
given you full satisfaction, but to avoid all 
ambigious interpretations and to show you that 
there is no doubtness in my meaning, I am 
willing to please you in words as well as 
substance. Read your petition, and you shall 
have5~uch an answer as I am sure will please you. 
After the Petition had been read, the clerk pro-
nounced the royal approval with "soit droict fait comme 
.56 
desire." But Charles was not finished. After the 
approval was given, he went on to lecture the members: 
This I am sure is full; yet no more than I 
granted you on my first answer; for the mean-
ing of that was to confirm all your liberties; 
knowing, according to your protestations that 
you neither mean nor can hurt my prerogative. 
And I assure you that my maxim is, that the 
people's liberties strengthen the King's 
prerogatives, and that the King's prerogative 
is to defend the people's liberties. You see 
how already I have shown myself. to satisfy your 
demands, so that I have done my part; wherefore 
if the Parliament have not a happy conclusion, 
the sin is you~sa I am free from it • .57 
.55· Lyon, Oracle of the Law, p. J26. 
56. The verb Droict can still give a double mean-
ing. The phrase can be changed from the simple "be it 
enacted" to "let justice be done as is desired." Ibid., 
p. 327. 
57. Gardiner, History of England, vol. 6, p. J09. 
It is because of this postscript by Charles that the 
writer must conclude that without royal support the 
Petition of Right would become a meaningless document. 
Elton agrees, calling the petition "as futile a document 
as ever constitutional struggles have thrown up." Elton, 
Studies in Politics, vol. 2, p. 160. Relf terms the 
document as "unenforcable." Relf, Petition of Right, p. 
,58. Wedgwood asserts that the Commons paid "to highly 
for their victory" because it "so hardened the King and 
inflamed the Commons that no accommodation could ever 
again be reached'.'--meaning that without mutual support 
79 
Sir Edward hastened to declare that "we could 
never have had a better answer. The King granteth all we 
58 
desire." He went on to joyfully claim that the "peti-
tion is a branch of the Magna Carta; and f itt to follow 
59 
that presedent." 
The Commons were thus able to adopt a definite 
procedure whereby the Commons were able to place on 
record the statement that certain practices were illegal 
according to the already existing laws and when the king 
gave his assent to this view the entire result became 
binding upon the judges while at the same time not 
60 
attempting to infringe the royal prerogative. Through 
this process of declaring the law (as parliament 
interpreted it) to be supreme, and by implying that 
ministers had a duty to act within the framework of law, 
the Petition of Right furthered the growth of responsible 
. . 61 
government in England. 
the petition would become mute. C.V. Wedgood, Stafford: 
1593-1641 (Westport, 1935), p. 71. 
58. Judson, Crisis of the Constitution, p. 265. 
59. Relf, Petition of Right, p. 56. Another jurist, Matthew Hale, was not nearly so quick as Coke 
to rank the Petition of Right with the Magna Carta. "The 
exercise of Martial Law, whereby any person should lose 
his life or member or liberty, may not be permitted in 
time of peace, when the King's Courts are open for all 
persons to receive justice, according to the laws of the 
land. This is ~he substance declared by the Petition of 
Right." Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law in 
England (London, 1716), p. 39. 
60. Adair, "Petition of Right," p. 101. 
61. Clayton Roberts, The Growth of Responsible 
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Charles had assented to the Petition of Right, but 
ever since that time the question has been debated as to 
62 
whether it was legally a bill or merely a petition. 
While it is true that the ceremony was exactly the same 
as that given bills, the key difference is the timing of 
the royal approval. According to the practice of the 
day, no law received the king's approval until the end 
of the session. Had the petition been statute, Charles's 
action would have automatically terminated the session. 
Of course this did not happen. Accordingly, on Ui.ay 27, 
the Commons were reminded that "if we send it up with 
the indorsement as a law we could have no answer till the 
late end of the Parliament." Another member protested 
that "though he cCharlesJ now give assent, it does not 
end the ses~ion." Therefore the conclusion must follow 
that it was Charles's intent to approve the petition 
6J 
as a petition and not as a statutory bill. 
In any case, this was Sir Edward Coke's last 
parliament--it was in this parliament of 1628 that he 
did his most important work for the constitution:for it 
Government in Stuart England (Cambridge, 1966), p. 67. 
62. Many leading historians assert that the Peti-
tion of Right was granted as a bills Gardiner, History 
of England, vol. 6, p. 309 and 327. Maitland, Constitu-
tional History, p. 307. Holdsworth, History of English 
Law, vol. 1, p. J82. Fewer have asserted that the 
Petition was granted as a petitiona Adair, "Petition of 
Right," p. 101. Relf, Petition of Right, p. 48. 
63. Relf, Petition of Right, p. 47-48. Adair, 
81 
was in that parliament that he took the largest part in 
framing and in carrying the Petition of Right, the first 
of those great constitutional documents since the Magna 
Carta which safeguard the liberties of the people by 
securing the supremacy of the law. Throughout his life, 
Coke had held the common law supreme, and that it only 
needed to be clearly declared to be all sufficient to 
safeguard the rights of Englishmen. The placing on the 
Statute Book of the Petition of Right, which embodied 
64 
these ideas, was a fitting apex to his 'career. 
"Petition of Right," p. 101. 
64. Holdsworth, Makers of English Law, p. 
117. 
CONCLUSION 
The parliament of 1628 effectively ended the 
career of Sir Edward Coke, but his influence remained and 
continued to mold English constitutional law. Coke's 
writings have had more influence upon the law than those 
1 
of any other legal writer. In historical perspective, 
Coke appeared at the transition from the medieval concept 
of law to the modern. Medievalists regarded law as un-
changeable, as a permanent body of rules which had ex-
isted from the birth of man and would continue until his 
disappearance. They saw no legal authority that could 
' 
change these rules; they were almost as rigid as the laws 
of the universe; there was no such thing as new law. 
Coke, on the other hand, regarded the old law as generally 
the best and therefore as dangerous to change. He was, 
nevertheless, quite aware that it had been and could be 
changed either by interpretation or by the introduction 
of new law. Cokefeit that "out of old fields must come 
2 
the new corne." He saw law as custom and this custom as 
J 
being in perpetual adaptation. 
In e~sence, Coke's theories and conflicts elevated 
common or customary law to a new height, making it funda-
L1-
mental law. And while pursuing his policy of the ele-
vation of the common law, Coke and his colleagues est-
1. Gist,"Writings of Coke,"p.505. 
2. MacKay, "Parliamentary Sovereieni ty, "p. 247. 
J. Pocock,Ancient Constitution,p.170. 
4. Hinton, "Constitutional Theories, "p.442. 
8J 
ablished the bench as an independent authority arbitrat~ 
5 
ing between the crown and the subject. 
But Sir Edward Coke's influence did not stop with 
English law. He eventually had a profound effect on both 
American law and its constitution. The first and most 
obvious effect is that the United States Constitution pro-
vides for a single body of law to be equally administered 
to all. Along with this principle came the separation of 
Church and State which allows each to function independ-
ently of the other, so long as each obeys the law as 
administered through the Constitution. Also embodied in 
the United States Constitution is the principle that law, 
as interpreted· by the Constitution, cannot be changed 
except by a majority of both Houses of ,Congress and with 
the approval of the President, unless, of course, his 
veto is overridden by a two-thirds vote in both Houses. 
To ensure that these changes of law are consistent 
with the Constitution, the framers borrowed from the 
Bonham controversy to establish the doctrine of judicial 
review. There is little doubt that Coke had not intended 
that judges be able to void laws passed by parliament, 
but what is basically important is that other legalists 
have thought that the power of judicial review was Coke's 
intent. Therefore, the Supreme Court in the case of 
Marbury ~ M~dison in 1803, established the rieht of the 
courts to be the watchdog of the Constitution to ensure 
5. Tanner,Constitutional Conflicts,p.37. 
84 
that there will be no infringement by Congress. 
The men who developed the basis of American legal 
thought also owe Coke the now accepted, and taken for 
granted, doctrine that asserts that when judges are hear-
ing a case they cannot be consulted individually or col-
lectively concerning a matter in or about to be adjudicat-
ed. This is not to say that the political and economic 
realities of life do not influence many judicial deci-
sions. This would be folly to assert, but this doctrine, 
in principle, allows the justices to determine the out-
come of the issues without undue outside pressures. 
Along the same vein, the judicial system was fur-
ther protected from outside interference by the idea of 
' 
a separation of powers. This theory was the justification 
for the practice that allows judges to remain in off ice 
for life instead of just for good behavior, as was the 
practice in the English system which usually meant at the 
pleasure of the crown, at least until 1701 when English 
justices got tenure. The many conflicts between the 
crown and Coke gave an excellent historical precedent 
for inclusion of life tenure. First James tried to 
silence Coke by removing him from the Gour~ of Common 
Pleas. When Coke's promotion did not silence him, James 
expelled the jurist from the bench in 1616. In the 
American system, and the English after 1701, a ·ijudge 
cannot be dismissed merely for unpopular decisions. 
However, the legal minds were also farsighted 
85 
enough to provide against the obviously incompetent or 
inept public official. The Constitution provided that 
"all civil officials of the United States, shall be 
rem~ved from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 
This precedent had been revived by Coke and his col-
leagues in 1621. Justice John Pickering was the first 
federal official to fall to the ax of impeachment and of 
the following conviction. The power of impeachment, 
born in 1376, and revived through the efforts of Coke, 
has shown that every official was and is indeed account-
able for his conduct while in off ice. 
Coke's greatest personal achievement, the Petition 
of Right, is also deeply rooted in the American legal 
tradition. When the colonies were preparing for the Rev-
olution of 1776, they often referred to the freedoms 
guaranteed by the Petition. And when the new Constitution 
of America was finally framed, it included the most im-
portant provision of the Petition of 1628. The Con-
stitution guarantees that "no soldier shall, in time of 
peace be quartered in any house, without consent of the 
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner. to be prescrib-
ed by law." The Constitution then goes on to provide that 
"probable cause" be made to justify any search and 
seizure, thereby giving the American people the protection 
of the same writ that brought the Petition of Right to 
its birth--the writ of habeas corpus. 
86 
There can be no doubt of the profound effect of 
Edward Coke upon the legal thought of the entire English 
speaking world. Perhaps the best gauge of the success 
and effect of this man can be seen through the men he 
opposed. James I often compared Coke to"'a cat, that 
whatever happened, cheJ would always light upon his 
6 
feet.'" But the supreme compliment was paid by Charles I. 
In 1631, when Coke's death was expected, Charles gave 
orders that Edward's papers were to be secured, to prevent 
the publication of anything that might be against the 
prerogative,"'for he held too great an oracle among the 
people, and they may be misled by anything that carries 
such an authority as all things to which he either speaks 
7 
or writes.'" 
6. The History of England from the Earliest 
Accounts of Time to the Death of the Late ueen Anne, 
vol.J, London,1722 _,p.125. 
7. Tanner, .constitutional Conflicts,p.42. 
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